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BOUDREAU v. UNITED STATES: GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY UNDER
THE FLOOD CONTROL ACT OF 1928 AND THE EFFECT
OF OUTDATED LEGISLATION ON SOCIETY
I. INTRODUCTION
As far back as 1717, the federal government was involved in projects
designed to lessen the damage to property owners in regularly flooded
areas.1 In 1883, the United States increased its efforts to control flooding
by adopting the Eads plan, which called for the construction of a series of
public works projects along the Mississippi River to prevent flooding and
protect river bank property.2 Despite the government's increased efforts,
the disastrous flood of 1927 caused severe damage to areas bordering the
Mississippi River.3 It was against this backdrop of devastation that Con-
gress began discussing further flood control projects and, more specifi-
cally, developed the Flood Control Act of 1928 (the "Act"). 4
1. United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 261 (1939) (discussing early
efforts by government to control flooding along Mississippi River). "As early as
1717, small levees were erected in the vicinity of New Orleans." Id.
2. Id. Floods had contributed to the fertility of the soil, but they also had
undermined the security of life and property. Id. at 260. "Until 1883, piecemeal
flood protection for separate areas was attempted through uncoordinated efforts
of individuals, communities, counties, districts and States." Id. at 261. Experience
had demonstrated that these disconnected levees were incapable of safeguarding
an ever increasing population drawn to the valley. Id. "Under... the Eads plan,
the United States undertook to cooperate with, and coordinate the efforts of the
people and authorities of the various river localities in order to effect a continuous
line of levees along both banks of the Mississippi for roughly nine hundred and
fifty miles .... " Id. For a further discussion of the history behind the Eads plan
and the flood problems along the Mississippi, see Jackson v. United States, 230 U.S.
1, 6-7, 11-12 (1912).
3. See Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. at 261 (describing devastation caused by flood of
1927). "'There were stretches of country [in Arkansas] miles in width and miles in
length in which . . . every house, every barn, every outbuilding of every nature,
even the fences, were swept away."' Id. (quoting 69 CONG. REc. 8191 (1928)).
"Recurrent floods... (and the disastrous flood of 1927] led to the conclusion that
levees alone, though continuous; would not protect the valley from floods." Id.
4. See 33 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (1994) (declaring policy of Congress which led to
Flood Control Act of 1928); United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986) (stat-
ing that Flood Control Act of 1928 was nation's response to disastrous flooding of
Mississippi River Valley in 1927). Section 701 (a) of the Flood Control Act of 1928
(the "Act") states:
It is hereby recognized that destructive floods upon the rivers of the
United States, upsetting orderly processes and causing loss of life and
property, including the erosion of lands, and impairing and obstructing
navigation, highways, railroads, and other channels of commerce be-
tween the States, constitute a menace to national welfare; that it is the
sense of Congress that flood control on navigable waters or their tributa-
ries is a proper activity of the Federal Government... that investigations
and improvements of rivers and other waterways, including watersheds
(1487)
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The Flood Control Act of 1928 provided a comprehensive ten-year
program for the entire Mississippi Valley.5 It contained provisions for a
general bank protection scheme, channel stabilization and river regula-
tion, all involving vast expenditures of public funds. 6 This program was
the largest public works project undertaken up to that time in the United
States. 7 It is clear from the legislative history of the Act that Congress's
decision to undertake such an expensive project was based on its desire to
protect citizens' property from any future flood disasters and a strong hu-
manitarian concern for those who suffered as a result of the 1927 flood.8
It is also evident, however, that Congress was equally concerned with pro-
tecting the U.S. government from liability for any damages resulting from
such a huge public works project. 9 In order to insulate the federal govern-
thereof, for flood-control purposes are in the interest of the general wel-
fare; that the Federal Government should improve or participate in the
improvement of navigable waters or their tributaries... for flood-control
purposes if the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of
the estimated costs, and if the lives and social security of people are other-
wise adversely affected.
33 U.S.C. § 701(a).
5. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. at 262 (describing flood protection provisions of
1928 Act). The court in Sponenbarger stated:
The 1928 Act... accepted the conception.., that levees alone would not
protect the valley from floods. Upon the assumption that there might be
floods of such proportions as to overtop the river's banks and levees de-
spite all the Government could do, this plan was designed to limit to pre-
determined points such escapes of floodwaters from the main channel.
The height of the levees at these predetermined points was not to be
raised to the general height of the levees along the river. These lower
points for possible flood spillways were designated "fuse plug levees."
Flood waters diverted over these lower "fuse plug levees" were intended
to relieve the main river channel and thereby prevent general flooding
over the higher levees along the banks. Additional "guide levees" were to
be constructed to confine the diverted flood waters within limited flood-
way channels leading from the fuse plugs.
Id. at 261-62.
6. Id. at 262.
7. James, 478 U.S. at 606-07 n.8 (noting that early estimates of cost of project
were $325 million). "This cost is almost forty times greater than the cost of the
Panama Canal." Michael S. Levine, Note, United States v. James: Expanding the
Scope of Sovereign Immunity for Federal Flood Control Activities, 37 CATH. U. L. REv. 219,
226 n.65 (1987) (citing 69 CONG. REc. 6640 (1928) (statement of Rep. Snell)).
8. See S. REP. No. 70-619, at 11 (1928); 69 CONG. REc. 6706 (1928) (statement
of Rep. Gregory). Representative Gregory stated:
[T]hose of you who just a year ago witnessed the mad rush of the mighty
Father of Waters, sweeping like a destroying angel over hundreds of
proud cities ... and millions of acres of fertile fields, or who later visited
the stricken area to view the scenes of the greatest peace-time disaster this
country has ever experienced, know.., the horror and agony left in the
wake of the 1927 flood.
Id.
9. See 69 CONG. REc. 6641 (1928) (statement of Rep. Snell). Representative
Snell stated:
I want this bill so drafted that it will contain all the safeguards necessary
1488 [Vol. 41: p. 1487
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ment from liability, Congress included an immunity provision, § 702(c),
within the Flood Control Act of 1928.10 This provision ensures that the
U.S. government will not be liable for any damage caused by floods or
flood waters.' It is this immunity provision that has been disputed in the
for the federal government. If we go down there and furnish protection
to these people-and I assume it is a national responsibility-I do not
want to have anything left out of the bill that would protect us now and
for all time to come. I for one do not want to open up a situation that will
cause thousands of lawsuits for damages against the Federal Government
in the next 10, 20, or 50 years.
Id.; see also James, 478 U.S. at 607 (citing remarks of Rep. Snell).
10. 33 U.S.C. § 702(c) (1994). Paragraph two of§ 702(c) of the Act, enacted
in May 1928 and carried forward through later versions of the Act, contains the
immunity provision. Id. It states:
No liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for
any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place: Provided, how-
ever, That if in carrying out the purposes of sections 702a, 702b to 702d,
702e to 7 02g, 702h, 702i, 702j, 702k, 7021, 702m, and 704 of this title it
shall be found that upon any stretch of the banks of the Mississippi River
it is impracticable to construct levees, either because such construction is
not economically justified or because such construction would unreason-
ably restrict the flood channel, and lands in such stretch of the river are
subjected to overflow and damage which are not now overflowed or dam-
aged by reason of the construction of levees on the opposite banks of the
river it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of
Engineers to institute proceedings on behalf of the United States Gov-
ernment to acquire either the absolute ownership of the lands so sub-
jected to overflow and damage or floodage rights over such lands.
Id.
11. Id. Government immunity for its own negligence is not a new concept in
American legal history. See Rebecca Heintz, Note, Federal Sovereign Immunity and
Clean Water: A Supreme Misstep, 24 ENrtL. L. 263, 263 (1994) ("[T]he United States
has retained the concept of sovereign immunity throughout its legal history.").
The sovereign immunity doctrine holds that the United States cannot be sued
without the consent of Congress. Jeremy Travis, Note, Rethinking Sovereign Immu-
nity After Bivens, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 597, 598-99 (1982). "The practical effect of the
sovereign immunity doctrine is that the United States cannot be held liable in
damages absent a statutory waiver of the immunity." Id. at 599.
Sovereign immunity can be traced back to thirteenth century England and
ideas of royal supremacy and the concept that the King could do no wrong. 1
WILiAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 238-39. "The king, moreover, is not only in-
capable of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong: he can never mean to do an
improper thing: in him is no folly or weakness." Id. at 246. Under this system, a
lord could not be sued in his own court without his consent, but he could be sued
in the court of a higher lord. Heintz, supra, at 266. The King being the highest
lord appeared immune from suit but judicial review of the King's failure to con-
sent to suit was available. See Travis, supra, at 605 ("A citizen seeking relief from
the Crown could direct a petition [of right] to the king .... [The petition] re-
? uired the consent of the sovereign.... [P]etitions of right were not refused
however,] unless the Chancellor who reviewed them found that there was in fact
no 'right'.... Once the petitioner obtained ajudgment, the King could not refuse
to enforce it."). Tortious acts, however, could not be attributed to the King
through a petition of right but only to his agents. Id. For a discussion of how torts
were processed against the King's agents instead of against the King, see Travis,
supra, at 605-06. For a further discussion of the history and development of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity under the English feudal legal system, see FREDER-
3
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federal courts for years.1 2
ICK W. MAITLAND & FRANCIS C. MONTAGUE, A SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY
(James F. Colby ed., 1915); David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive
Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 2-5 (1972); W.S. Holdsworth, The His-
tory of Remedies Against the Crown, 38 LAw Q. REv. 141 (1922); John P. Stevens, Is
Justice Irrelevant?, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1121, 1124-25 (1993); Heintz, supra, at 266;
Travis, supra, at 604-07.
The American version of the doctrine of sovereign immunity was definedjudi-
cially through a series of Supreme court decisions. Travis, supra, at 608. "There is
nothing in the Constitution declaring the federal government immune from suit
by its citizens." Heintz, supra, at 267. If a citizen wanted to bring a claim against
the colonial government it was made in the form of a petition of grace not a peti-
tion of right as under the English system. Travis, supra, at 608. The popular view
at the time was that "'[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amena-
ble to suit of an individual without its consent."' Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No.
81, at 508 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1908)). The first
Supreme Court case dealing with this issue was Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419 (1793). This case strayed from the popular view and found that citizens of
South Carolina could bring suit against the State of Georgia and that this was al-
lowed under the Constitution. Heintz, supra, at 268. For further discussion of
Chisholm, see Travis, supra, at 609-11.
After Chisholm, Congress proposed the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitu-
tion which purported to withdraw federal jurisdiction over suits against a state
brought by citizens of another state for fear that the substantial debts of the
Revolution would dry up the states' treasuries. Id. at 610. After the adoption of
the Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme Court embraced the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. Stevens, supra, at 1123; see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264 (1821) ("The universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced
or prosecuted against the United States; that the judiciary does not authorize such
suits."). Thejudges, however, developed methods of circumventing the immunity.
Travis, supra, at 612. For a further discussion of such methods, see Heintz, supra, at
269-70 and Travis, supra, at 612-14. Due to the harshness of the doctrine, Congress
has also circumvented its use by revoking the federal government's immunity in a
number of situations. Heintz, supra, at 271. For a list of some of these statutes, see
Travis, supra, at 602 n.24.
Despite the revocation of the doctrine in some situations, it still "is unques-
tionably alive and well today" in many situations like flood control. Stevens, supra,
at 1126. For a general discussion of the sovereign immunity doctrine, see PAUL
BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
1339-56 (2d ed. 1973); Engdahl, supra, at 1; Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amend-
ment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1977);
Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L.
REV. 1 (1963); Stevens, supra, at 1121; Heintz, supra, at 26; Travis, supra, at 597.
12. See Fisher v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 31 F.3d 683, 685 (8th
Cir. 1994) (holding that § 702(c) protects government from liability if "govern-
mental control of flood waters was a substantial factor in causing the injury [or
damages]"); Fryman v. United States, 901 F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting
Ninth Circuit test and holding that test for immunity is whether "flood-control
activities increase the probability of injuries"); Boyd v. United States ex rel. United
States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 881 F.2d 895, 900 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding Ninth
Circuit's "'wholly unrelated"' test too broad and concluding that in Tenth Circuit
one must show "necessary link" between flood control activity and damages before
immunity would apply and that § 702(c) did not shield government from liability
associated with operating recreational facility); McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d
558, 562 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that § 702(c) protects Government from liability
unless damage or injury is "'wholly unrelated to any Act of Congress authorizing
expenditures of federal funds for flood control, or any act undertaken pursuant to
1490 [Vol. 41: p. 1487
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In certain situations, the circuit courts have uniformly applied
§ 702(c) immunity13 They have consistently agreed that government im-
munity extends to flood control projects beyond those of the Mississippi
Valley.1 4 They have also agreed that the immunity provision applies even
if the government was negligent in causing the damage. 15 Nevertheless,
any such authorization"' (citation omitted)); Hayes v. United States, 585 F.2d 701,
703 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that § 702(c) does not apply where operation of
flood control project for recreational purposes caused damage); see also Hiersche v.
United States, 503 U.S. 923, 925 (1992) (recognizing split in circuits over when
Government is immune under § 702(c) but refusing to settle dispute). The Court
in Hiersche stated: "[t]his Court has a duty to resolve conflicts among the courts of
appeals. As several scholars have recognized, however, that duty is not absolute.
Some conflicts are tolerable., Others can be resolved more effectively by Congress.
This is such a case." Id. For a further discussion of the differing views on the appli-
cation of § 702(c), see infra notes 36-126 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Lenoir v. Porters Creek, 586 F.2d 1081, 1086 (6th Cir. 1978) (cit-
ing cases from several different circuits which have consistently agreed that
§ 702(c) applies to projects beyond Mississippi Valley and also to previously dis-
puted question of governmental negligence). For a list of these and additional
cases, see infra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
14. See Aetna Ins. Co. v. United States, 628 F.2d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir. 1980)
(finding that government immunity under § 702(c) extends to projects beyond
Mississippi Valley); Lenoir, 586 F.2d at 1086 (same); Callaway v. United States, 568
F.2d 684, 686 (10th Cir. 1978) (stating that Flood Control Act of 1928 was reaf-
firmed by Act of 1936 that authorized flood control projects throughout country,
thus making 1928 Act applicable to all flood control projects); Clark v. United
States, 218 F.2d 446, 451-52 (9th Cir. 1954) (finding that supplemental Acts au-
thorizing expenditures on other rivers incorporate provisions of 1928 Act, there-
fore making it applicable to areas other than Mississippi); National Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 210 F.2d 263, 274 (8th Cir. 1954) (stating that words, "floods or
flood waters at any place" support finding that immunity extends beyond
Mississippi).
In Lenoir, the court stated: "This view [that § 702(c) applies only to the Mis-
sissippi Valley] has not commended itself to those courts which have considered
it." Lenoir, 586 F.2d at 1086. "Most persuasive perhaps is the plain language ... of
the Act itself. It applies to floods 'at any place."' Id. at 1086 n.4.
Additionally, the court in National Manufacturing Co., which was concerned
with whether the Act extended to the Kansas River, stated:
The words of the section, "floods or flood waters at any place," in the
context of the Act and the succeeding flood control Acts to which the
section is extended and which legislate concerning flood control projects
throughout the entire country, specifically include the Kansas River and
its floods and flood waters. The fact that the words Mississippi River
"have lingered on in the successive editions of the United States Code is
immaterial."
210 F.2d at 274.
15. See, e.g., Aetna, 628 F.2d at 1204 (finding that § 702(c) immunity extends
to government negligence in connection with flood control projects); Callaway,
568 F.2d at 687 (finding that plaintiff's claims for damage caused by floodwaters
that resulted from government's negligent construction of integral part of flood
control project were barred because immunity provision is broad and covers gov-
ernment negligence); Florida E. Coast Ry. Co. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184,
1191 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding that consensus has been reached by federal courts
that "United States is protected from liability for damages caused by 'floods or
flood waters' in connection with flood control projects, even when the govern-
NOTE 14911996]
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the circuits remain split on the more difficult issue of whether government
immunity attaches under § 702(c) when it is unclear if floods or flood
waters caused the injury within the meaning of the statute. 16 This is the
issue that arose in Boudreau v. United States.17 This Note discusses how the
circuit courts have interpreted the immunity provision of § 702(c) since its
enactment in 1928. First, Part II discusses how the United States Supreme
Court and the circuit courts have decided cases similar to Boudreau.18
Next, Part III provides the factual background for the Boudreau decision.' 9
Part IV analyzes the reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in Boudreau and contains a critical analysis of the Fifth
Circuit's decision. 20 Finally, Part V of this Note considers the practical
impact of the Fifth Circuit's decision to allow the government to success-
fully invoke immunity for accidents occurring in multi-purpose flood con-
trol facilities and concludes that the Flood Control Act of 1928 is outdated
and that the burden for correcting outdated legislation lies not with the
judicial system but with Congress.2 1
II. BACKGROUND
In order to provide a better understanding of the Boudreau decision,
this Part focuses on the background leading up to Boudreau. First, Section
A discusses the legislative history of the Flood Control Act of 1928 and
§ 702(c). 2 2 Next, Section B focuses on the application of § 702(c) prior to
ment's own negligence has caused or aggravated the losses"); McClaskey v. United
States, 386 F.2d 807, 808 (9th Cir. 1967) (agreeing with other Ninth Circuit courts
that § 702(c) covers "'negligent construction or maintenance of flood works"');
Stover v. United States, 332 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1964) ("We hold that 33 U.S.C.
§ 702(c) is an immunity statute covering even ordinary negligent construction or
maintenance of flood works ....").
16. See Bailey v. United States, 35 F.3d 1118, 1124 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding
that application of immunity provision depends on whether flood control activities
at project increased probability of injury to plaintiff); Boyd, 881 F.2d at 900 (hold-
ing that immunity never attaches when waters at issue are being used for recrea-
tional purposes); McCarthy, 850 F.2d at 562 (holding that immunity applies so long
as injury is not wholly unrelated to flood control).
17. 53 F.3d 81 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 771 (1996). At issue in
Boudreau was whether the United States could claim immunity under the Flood
Control Act of 1928 for the alleged negligent acts of the Coast Guard in patrolling
a flood control lake. Id. The court focused on whether the injuries to the plaintiff
were "'from or by ... flood waters."' Id. at 83.
18. For a discussion of how the Supreme Court and the circuit courts have
handled the issue, see infra notes 36-126 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the facts of Boudreau v. United States, see infra notes 134-
44 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the reasoning of the Boudreau court, including the
dissenting opinion and a critical analysis, see infra notes 145-231 and accompany-
ing text.
21. For a discussion of the practical impact of the Fifth Circuit's decision, see
infra notes 232-49 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Flood Control Act of 1928
and § 702(c), see infra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
1492 [Vol. 41: p. 1487
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 5 [1996], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol41/iss5/4
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. James.23 Finally, Section C
discusses the James decision and the circuit courts' application of § 702(c)
after that landmark decision.2 4
A. The Statute and Its Legislative History
In Boudreau v. United States, the Fifth Circuit confronted the applica-
tion of the Flood Control Act of 1928.25 Specifically, the court considered
the application of § 702(c) of the Act.2 6 Section 702(c) contains an immu-
nity provision for federal government involvement in flood control
projects. 2 7 Interpretation of this provision has been a source of contro-
versy among the circuits for a number of years.2 8 The relevant text of the
statute reads: "No liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the
United States for any damages from or by floods or flood waters at any
place .... 29 Legislative history and case law that has interpreted § 702(c)
provide an understanding of the purpose of the immunity provision.3 0
The remarks of Representative Snell, Chairman of the House Rules
Committee in 1928, indicate that Congress's purpose in enacting § 702(c)
was to allow the government to establish federal public works projects near
flood prone rivers, while at the same time limit the government's liability
resulting from those projects.3 1 Representative Snell stated that the bill
should include liability safeguards for the federal government so that if it
23. 478 U.S. 597 (1986). For a discussion of how other circuits have applied§ 702(c) prior to the 1986 Supreme Court decision in United States v. James, see
infra notes 36-66 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the only Supreme Court decision that has addressed
this issue and the application of § 702(c) by the circuits after that decision, see
infra notes 67-126 and accompanying text.
25. Boudreau v. United States, 53 F.3d 81, 82 (5th Cir. 1985). The issue
presented was whether the Flood Control Act of 1928 immunized the United
States from liability for the alleged negligence of the Coast Guard Auxiliary in
attempting to tow a stranded recreational vessel on a flood control lake. Id.
26. Id.
27. 33 U.S.C. § 702(c) (1994).
28. For a listing of these cases and their holdings, see supra note 12.
29. 33 U.S.C. § 702(c). For the complete text of paragraph two of § 702(c)
which contains the immunity provision in question, see supra note 10.
30. See 69 CONG. REc. 6641 (1928) (remarks of Rep. Snell) (discussing pro-
posed provision and concern that Congress help provide flood protection but at
same time not be liable for damage caused by such facilities); see also United States
v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 603-09 (1986) (interpreting immunity provision and its
legislative history and concluding that Congress's purpose in enacting immunity
provision was "to immunize the Federal Government from liability for damage re-
sulting directly from construction of flood control projects and from flooding
caused by factors beyond the government's control"). For a further discussion of
the congressional history behind the immunity provision, see infra notes 30-35 and
accompanying text. For a further discussion of case law which has interpreted
§ 702(c) and its congressional history and provides an understanding of the pur-
pose of the provision, see infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
31. 69 CONG. REc. 6641 (1928) (remarks of Rep. Snell). For the exact re-
marks of Representative Snell, see supra note 9.
1996] NOTE 1493
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endeavored to protect citizens living near flood areas, it would not be re-
sponsible for any damages stemming from the flood projects. 3 2
Additionally, several other representatives indicated a desire to immu-
nize the government from suits arising from government created flood
control facilities.3 3 These representatives stated that the United States
should only be liable for the direct cost of the construction project and for
no other expense.3 4 This legislative history clearly indicates that it was
Congress's intent in creating § 702(c) to allow the government to con-
struct much needed flood control facilities while still retaining immunity
from any liability associated with such projects. 3 5
Case law supports this reading of the immunity provision's purpose.
3 6
Various courts in several different circuits have all concluded that Con-
gress intended § 702(c) to protect the government from lawsuits arising
from government involvement in the construction of flood prevention
projects. 3 7 Despite their agreement on the purpose of the immunity pro-
32. 69 CONG. REc. 6641 (remarks of Rep. Snell).
33. See id. at 6999-7000, 7028 (remarks of Reps. Friar and Spearing). "While it
is wise to insert that provision [§ 702(c)] in the bill, it is not necessary, because the
Supreme Court of the United States has decided ... that the government is not
liable for any of these damages." Id. at 7028 (remarks of Rep. Spearing).
34. Id.
35. See id. at 6641, 6999-7000, 7028 (remarks of Reps. Snell, Friar and Spear-
ing respectively).
36. For examples of case law, see infra note 37.
37. See, e.g., Peterson v. United States, 367 F.2d 271, 275-76 (9th Cir. 1966).
In Peterson, the Ninth Circuit stated:
We are unaware of any liability which existed on the part of the United
States toward other parties for damages suffered to life or property
caused solely by flood or flood waters of a navigable river since no duty
was imposed upon the United States, as a sovereign, to control a naviga-
ble river simply because such river may be subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States under one or more clauses of the Constitution of the
United States.
When Section 702c was enacted in 1928, and re-enacted in 1936, the
Federal Tort Claims Act had not been enacted, and the United States,
broadly speaking, possessed sovereign immunity from actions sounding
in tort. Hence, it cannot be asserted that Congress intended Section 702c
to be but a declaration of existing law. Rather, it is clear that Congress
intended by the enactment of Section 702c in the Act of May 15, 1928...
to be an integral part of a plan or policy on the part of the Government
to embark on a vast construction program to prevent or minimize the
incidences of loss occurring from floods and flood waters by the building
of dikes, dams, levees, and related works, and to keep the Government
entirely free from liability for damages when loss occurs, notwithstanding
the works undertaken by the Government to minimize it.
Id. at 275-76; see also United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 608 (1986) ("Congress
clearly sought to ensure beyond a doubt that sovereign immunity would protect
the Government from 'any' liability associated with flood control."); E. Ritter &
Co. v. Department of the Army, Corps of Eng'rs, 874 F.2d 1236, 1239 (8th Cir.
1989) (citingJames as support for its reading of § 702(c) analysis); Aetna Ins. Co. v.
United States, 628 F.2d 1201, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Peterson for quote
above and stating "[ft]hat purpose [stated in Peterson] would not be furthered by
[Vol. 41: p. 14871494
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vision, the courts have not applied § 702(c) in a consistent fashion.3 8
B. Application of § 702(c) in Cases Prior to the Supreme Court Decision in
United States v. James
Circuit court cases interpreting § 702(c) prior to the Supreme Court
decision in United States v. James,3 9 were exclusively cases of flood-damaged
property damage resulting from the governmental negligence in the oper-
ation of flood control facilities. 40 In all but two of these decisions, the
limiting the immunity to single purpose flood control projects, or even to projects
in which flood control is a dominant goal").
Further, in National Manufacturing Co., the court stated:
Thus it appears on inspection... that when Congress entered upon flood
control on the great scale contemplated by the Acts it safeguarded the
United States against liability of any kind for damage from or by floods
or flood waters in the broadest and most emphatic language. The cost of
the flood control works itself would inevitably be very great and Congress
plainly manifested its will that those costs should not have the flood dam-
ages that will inevitably recur added to them. Undoubtedly floods which
have traditionally been deemed "Acts of God" wreak the greatest property
destruction of all natural catastrophies and where floods occur after flood
control work has been done and relied on the damages are vastly in-
creased. But there is no question of the power and right of Congress to
keep the government entirely free from liability when floods occur,
notwithstanding the great government works undertaken to minimize
them. Congress included Section 3 in the 1928 Act and carried it forward
into the 1936 Act and others with intent to exercise that power com-
pletely and to absolutely bar any such federal liability.
National Mfr. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263, 270 (8th Cir. 1954).
38. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States Dep't of the Army, Corps of Eng'rs, 35 F.3d
1118, 1124 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that immunity provision applies only if activi-
ties at project increased probability of injury to plaintiff); Boyd v. United States ex
rel. United States Army, Corps of Eng'rs, 881 F.2d 895, 900 (10th Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing that immunity provision does not attach when injury results from recreational
use of flood control waters); McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that immunity provision applies unless injury is "wholly unrelated"
to flood control). For a further discussion of Hiersche v. United States and the split
among the circuits, see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
39. 478 U.S. 597 (1986). For a further discussion of the facts and reasoning
of the James decision, see infra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Portis v. Folk Constr. Co., 694 F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 1982) (involving
suit by farm owners whose property was flooded and crops damaged as result of
alleged negligence of government in building flood control structure); Morici
Corp. v. United States, 681 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1982) (involving suit for crop dam-
age allegedly caused by excessively high levels of water in river due to negligent
operation of dam and reservoir works by Government); Pierce v. United States, 650
F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1981) (involving suit by several individuals to recover for dam-
age to land caused by alleged negligent impoundment of waters behind federal
flood control dam); Aetna, 628 F.2d at 1201 (concerning suit by insurance com-
pany to recover money paid to insureds for damage to their property caused by
collapse of dam built under federal flood control project); Burlison v. United
States, 627 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1980) (involving negligently designed road and drain
as part of federal flood control project which caused flood damage to plaintiff's
crops); Taylor v. United States, 590 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1979) (dealing with flooding
damage to plaintiffs' farm caused by Government's alleged negligent operation of
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court held that the government was immune under § 702(c).41 These two
cases involved government action unrelated to flood control, and, there-
fore, the courts held that the immunity provision did not apply.
42
Cases in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s dealt with several different as-
pects of the application of § 702(c) of the Act. These cases dealt with the
question of whether the immunity provision extended to areas other than
the Mississippi Valley.43 They also considered the issue of whether the Act
dam downstream from plaintiffs' property); Lenoir v. Porters Creek Watershed
Dist., 586 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir. 1978) (concerning suit for damages to flooded pas-
ture lands caused by negligent construction and design of channel flowing
through property); Hayes v. United States, 585 F.2d 701 (4th Cir. 1978) (involving
suit by farmer to recover for erosion of river bank and flooding of farm caused by
operation of dam's flood gates); Callaway v. United States, 568 F.2d 684 (10th Cir.
1978) (involving suit by farmers alleging damage to their crops and other property
caused by Government negligence); Florida E. Coast Ry. Co. v. United States, 519
F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1975) (involving suit by railroad for damage to its tracks be-
cause of washout allegedly caused by negligence of Government in management of
flood control facility); Graci v. United States, 456 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1971) (concern-
ing suit for damages to property resulting from alleged negligence of Government
in construction of Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet); McClaskey v. United States, 386
F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1967) (involving suit for injury to motel property allegedly
caused by negligent obstruction of creek by Corps of Engineers); Parks v. United
States, 370 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1966) (involving suit for property damage caused by
alleged Government negligence in construction, maintenance and operation of
flood control project); Peterson, 367 F.2d at 271 (dynamiting of ice jam by Govern-
ment caused flood waters to damage plaintiffs' vessels); Stover v. United States,
332 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1964) (flooding damage occurred to property because Gov-
emment constructed levees broke); Clark v. United States, 218 F.2d 446 (9th Cir.
1954) (flooding caused substantial property damage to town after flood waters
broke through embankment built and patrolled by Government for flood control
purposes); National Mfg. Co., 210 F.2d at 263 (involving suit by business owner
seeking to recover for damages to his private business alleging that Government
negligently lulled him into false sense of security by erroneous weather and flood
information disseminated by governmental agency).
41. See Grac, 456 F.2d at 27; Peterson, 367 F.2d at 276. In Graci, the plaintiffs
sued the Government for damage to their properties caused by flood waters re-
leased because of the Government's alleged negligent construction of the Missis-
sippi River-Gulf Outlet. Grad, 456 F.2d at 22. The court held that because the
project in this case was a navigational project and not a flood control project, the
immunity provision did not apply. Id. The Government could not claim immunity
for its negligence when it was not involved in a flood control project. Id. at 27.
In Peterson, the plaintiffs sued the Government for damage to his property
caused by flooding after a group of engineers from the Ladd Air Force Base dyna-
mited an ice jam up stream from plaintiffs' property. Peterson, 367 F.2d at 272.
The explosion caused a large accumulation of ice and an immense volume of
water to move downstream and damage plaintiffs' property. Id. The court held
that the decision to dynamite was wholly unrelated to any Act of Congress authoriz-
ing expenditures of federal funds for flood control. Id. at 275. The court further
found that the dynamiting was done to alleviate flood waters in an attempt to pre-
vent further damage to Ladd Air Force Base. Id. Therefore, the court held that
under its "wholly unrelated" test, government immunity did not apply. Id. at 276.
42. Grad, 456 F.2d at 27; Peterson, 367 F.2d at 276. For a discussion of these
decisions, see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
43. See Lenoir, 586 F.2d at 1086 (holding that statute applies to areas other
than Mississippi and citing numerous cases to support holding); Clark, 218 F.2d at
1496
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applied to governmental negligence. 44 Additionally, they addressed
whether the Act applied to nonnatural, man-made floods. 45 Most of the
courts held that the Act applied in these situations. 46 In these cases, how-
ever, the fact that the damage was caused by flood waters from flood con-
trol facilities was not disputed.4 7 Therefore, the issue in Boudreau of
whether the damage was caused "by or from flood waters" never arose.
48
Until the early 1970s, the circuits had been consistent in their analysis of
§ 702(c) and its application to cases which involved property damage
caused by flooding of a federal flood control project.4 9
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the circuits began developing sepa-
rate tests for the application of § 702(c) immunity.5 0 The Ninth Circuit,
in Aetna v. United States,51 developed one such test.5 2 The Ninth Circuit
451-52 (holding that § 702(c) applied to other areas besides Mississippi because
supplemental acts authorizing expenditures on other rivers incorporated
§ 702(c)); National Mfg. Co., 210 F.2d at 274 (holding that § 702(c) is extended to
cover flood control projects throughout entire country and that fact that words
Mississippi River "'have lingered on in the successive editions of the United States
Code"' is immaterial) (quoting Stephan v. United States, 319 U.S. 423, 426
(1943)).
44. See Callaway, 568 F.2d at 687 (holding Government immune despite negli-
gent construction of bridge embankment which caused damage to plaintiff's prop-
erty); Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 519 F.2d at 1191 (holding Government is immune
from damage caused "by floods or flood waters" even when Government's own
negligence caused or aggravated losses); Graci, 456 F.2d at 27 (finding that Gov-
ernment negligence connected with flood control falls under § 702(c) immunity);
McClaskey, 386 F.2d at 808 (holding that § 702(c) provides government immunity
from liability for its negligence); Stover, 332 F.2d at 206 (holding that statute ap-
plied whether government was negligent or not and that it covered even ordinary
negligence).
45. See, e.g., Aetna, 628 F.2d at 1204 (holding § 702(c) applies to floods caused
by Government negligence and not solely natural conditions); Parks, 370 F.2d at 92
(holding that § 702(c) immunity was not limited to floods of natural origin).
46. For cases and specific holdings, see supra notes 14-15, 43-45 and accompa-
nying text.
47. E.g., Taylor v. United States, 590 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1979); Callaway, 568
F.2d at 684; Hayes v. United States, 585 F.2d 701 (4th Cir. 1978); Florida E. Coast
Ry. Co, 519 F.2d at 20; McClaskey, 386 F.2d at 807; Parks, 370 F.2d at 92; Stover, 332
F.2d at 203; Clark, 218 F.2d at 446; National Mfg. Co., 210 F.2d at 263.
48. See Boudreau v. United States, 53 F.3d 81, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating
issue was whether Flood Control Act of 1928 provided immunity for United States
from liability for alleged negligence of Coast Guard Auxillary in attempting to tow
stranded recreational vessel on flood control lake), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 771
(1996).
49. For a discussion of these cases and their holdings, see supra notes 40-48
and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Aetna, 628 F.2d at 1203 (drawing on its reasoning in previous case
of Peterson v. United States, Ninth Circuit developed "wholly unrelated" test to deter-
mine when to apply § 702(c) immunity); Taylor, 590 F.2d at 266 (relying on "from
or by" wording in statute, court developed "substantial factor" test to determine
applicability of § 702(c)); Hayes, 585 F.2d at 703 (holding that its test would be
whether damage was result of operation of facility as flood control facility).
51. 628 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1980).
52. Id. at 1203.
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held that the immunity provision did not apply when the damage com-
plained of was "wholly unrelated to any act of Congress authorizing expen-
diture of federal funds for flood control.153 In Aetna, the plaintiff
insurance company sued the Government to recover money paid to land-
owners because of the 1976 collapse of the Teton Dam, a federal flood
control project.5 4 The court found the Government immune from suit
holding that although the Teton Dam project was not exclusively dedi-
cated to flood control, flood control was one of the purposes of the pro-
ject.55 Therefore, the Government was immune from a negligence suit
because the damage was not "wholly unrelated" to any act of Congress
authorizing expenditure of federal funds for flood control.5 6 The Ninth
Circuit has consistently applied this test in later cases.5 7
The Eighth Circuit's test for applying the immunity provision was sim-
ilar to the Ninth Circuit's test, but its standard was not as difficult for a
53. Id. (citing Peterson v. United States, 367 F.2d 271, 275 (9th Cir. 1966)).
The Aetna court stated that the narrow question before it was whether the damage
at issue was related to government flood control activities. Id.
54. Id. at 1202. In Aetna, the plaintiff insurance company alleged that the
Government's design and construction of the Teton Dam was negligent and that
the government's negligence caused the dam's collapse. Id. After the dam col-
lapsed, Congress responded by providing direct compensation to injured parties
but expressly excluded claims of insurance carriers like Aetna for reimbursement
of claims paid to their insureds. Id. at 1203. Congress further provided that "an
insurer could exercise 'any right of action against the United States to which it may
be entitled under any other laws for payments made to [insureds] ....' Id. (quot-
ing Teton Dam Disaster Assistance Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-400, 90 Stat. 1211).
55. Id. The court in Aetna is not without support on this point as evidenced
by the fact that several other courts have also reached this conclusion. See, e.g.,
Reese v. South Fla. Water Management Dist., 59 F.3d 1128, 1130 (11th Cir. 1995)
(finding that plaintiff was barred from suit even though water which caused injury
was not released by United States exclusively for purposes of flood control); Morici
Corp. v. United States, 681 F.2d 645, 648 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that determina-
tive factor was whether purpose of project authorized by Congress was flood con-
trol, and if flooding was related to use of that project then immunity attaches);
Pierce v. United States, 650 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding if injury resulted
from operation of federal project for flood control purposes, Government immu-
nity is complete); McClaskey v. United States, 386 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1967) (find-
ing that although project which caused damage was also built for navigational
purposes, Government could still claim immunity because flood control was also
purpose of project).
56. Aetna, 628 F.2d at 1202, 1204.
57. See McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying
"wholly unrelated" test to case of swimmer who was rendered quadriplegic after
accident in federal flood control facility); Moar/c, 681 F.2d at 645 (holding that
plaintiff's damages were related to use of project for flood control purposes and
therefore immunity attached); Pierce, 650 F.2d at 202 (holding that Government's
decision to impound waters behind dam was not "wholly unrelated" to any act
authorizing federal funds for flood control and therefore, Government was im-
mune from liability for damages caused by negligent flooding). For a discussion of
later Ninth Circuit cases and their holdings, see infra notes 78-87 and accompany-
ing text.
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plaintiff to meet.5 8 In Taylor v. United States,59 the Eighth Circuit stated:
The bar against federal liability for damages is made to apply wherever
floods or flood waters have been substantial and material factors in de-
stroying or damaging property."60 The Taylor case involved alleged gov-
ernmental negligence in the operation of a dam that caused flooding of
the plaintiff's property.6 1 The Taylor court held that the Government was
immune because the flooding was a substantial factor in causing the
damage. 6
2
Finally, the Fourth Circuit, in Hayes v. United States,6 3 developed a test
that was also fairly consistent with the Ninth Circuit's test, although again
it was worded differently. 64. This circuit granted immunity when the dam-
age was a result of the operation of the facility as a flood control project. 65
58. E.g., Taylor v. United States, 590 F.2d 263, 266 (8th Cir. 1979).
59. 590 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1979).
60. Id. at 266. For a discussion of how the Eighth Circuit has applied this test
in its later cases, see infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
61. Taylor, 590 F.2d at 264. In Taylor, the plaintiffs owned a farm located be-
tween two dam projects and upstream from a reservoir connected to one dam. Id.
at 265. During a severe rainstorm many rivers became flooded near plaintiffs'
property. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the government, during this time period,
wrongfully and negligently operated the dam and reservoir impoundment above
the legally authorized water level. Id. They contended that this caused the im-
poundment waters of the reservoir to back up and cause crop damage on their
property. Id.
62. Id. at 266. The court did not apply the more demanding "wholly unre-
lated" test developed by the Ninth Circuit. Additionally, the court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that the water which caused damage to their property was
backwater and that § 702(c) did not grant the government immunity from the tort
of trespass by backwater impoundment injury. Id. The court stated:
Backwater is a body or accumulation of water resulting from an obstruc-
tion or opposing current. Floodwater has been defined as "[w] ater which
has overflowed the natural banks of the stream in its natural channel, and
which is contained by a system of levees;" flood has been defined as
"water which inundates an area of the surface of the earth where it ordi-
narily would not be expected to be."
Id. at 266-67 (citation omitted). The court applied these definitions and con-
cluded that the plaintiffs' distinction between floodwaters and backwaters was not
valid for the purposes of § 702(c). Id. at 267. The court stated: "We can see no
rational distinction between floodwaters and backwaters that would lead to a differ-
ent result in this case." Id.
63. 585 F.2d 701 (4th Cir. 1978).
64. Id. at 703.
65. Id. In Hayes, the plaintiff brought suit against the Government for dam-
age to his farm caused by the Government's operation of the flood gates of a dam
upstream from plaintiff's farm. Id. at 701. The court held that "it [is] not incon-
ceivable that all or some of the releases [which caused damages to plaintiff's prop-
erty] were solely for the purpose of promoting recreational uses of the impounded
waters and not in the least in aid of the operation of the dam as a flood control
facility," and, therefore, the immunity provision may not apply. Id. at 702. The
court remanded the case because it believed that although it may be assumed that
all of the releases of water, or most of them were incidental to the dam's operation
as a flood control facility, it was not proper for the lower court to dismiss the case
based on Rule 12(b)(6). Id. This was especially true when, as here, dismissal was
1996] NOTE 1499
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The court stated, however, "[i]f the plaintiff could prove damage to his
farm as a result of the dam's operation as a recreational facility without
relation to the operation of the dam as a flood control project, he would
avoid the absolute bar of § 702(c)."66 This statement became a source of
controversy because no other circuit had made the distinction between
recreational use and flood control use.
C. The Supreme Court's Decision in United States v. James and the Cases
that Followed
1. The Supreme Court Decision
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court heard its first case dealing
with government immunity for flood control damage.6 7 The case consoli-
dated two separate appeals from decisions of the Fifth Circuit involving
the drowning deaths of recreational users of flood control projects. 68
United States v. James was the first case in which the plaintiffs claim was for
personal injury damages and not property damage. 69 In James, the
premised merely on an assumption. Id. The court remanded the case to deter-
mine why the releases were in fact made. Id. The court was concerned with the
purposes for the release of the waters which caused the damage because its test for
application of the immunity provision depended on whether the facility was being
used for flood control purposes. Id. at 703.
66. Id. at 702-03.
67. United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597 (1986); see also Arthur Baron, United
States Immunity at Flood Control Projects from Claims for Injuries, 11 Am. J. TRLAL ADvoc.
417, 421 (1988) (indicating that this was first case before Supreme Court on this
issue).
68. James, 478 U.S. at 597. The litigation arose from a series of accidents that
occurred in the reservoirs of federal flood control projects in Arkansas and Louisi-
ana. Id. In both accidents, recreational users of the reservoirs were injured or
drowned when they were swept through retaining structures after those structures
were opened by the United States Corps of Engineers to control flooding. Id. In
the Arkansas case, the district court held that even though the Government had
"willfully and even maliciously failed to warn of a known danger," it was immune
from damages under § 702(c). Id. at 600. In the Louisiana case, the district court
dismissed the case despite the Government conceding that "it negligently failed to
warn the decedent." Id. at 601-02. In doing so, the court held that the Govern-
ment was immune under § 702(c) from personal injury damages resulting from
floods or floodwaters in the negligent operation of flood control projects. Id. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit heard the consolidated appeal and reversed
the district court's judgments. Id. In so doing, the Fifth Circuit held that Congress
intended § 702(c) to shield the Government from:
[L]iability for damage resulting directly from construction of flood con-
trol projects and from liability for flooding caused by factors beyond the
Government's control, but that Congress had not intended "to shield the
negligent or wrongful acts of government employees" . . . including the
failure "to warn the public of the existence of hazards to their accepted
use of government-impounded water, or nearby land."
Id. (quotingJames v. United States, 760 F.2d 590, 599, 603 (5th Cir. 1985)).
69. Levine, supra note 7, at 232. "The applicability of § 702(c) immunity to
actions brought against the government to recover for personal injuries was con-
sidered for the first time in James v. United States." Id. For a discussion of property
damage cases which arose before James, see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court made a number of conclusions about § 702(c) immunity
later would cause confusion among the circuits. 70 The Supreme Court
held that the terms "flood and flood waters" in § 702(c) applied "to all
waters contained in or carried through a federal flood control project for
purposes of or related to flood control, as well as to waters that such
projects cannot control."71 The Court dismissed the plaintiffs' argument
that even if § 702(c) granted immunity in flood control projects, the Gov-
ernment was not entitled to immunity in this case because government
employees' mismanagement of recreational activities, wholly unrelated to
flood control, caused the injuries.72 The Court stated, "[w]e think ...
that the manner in which to convey warnings, including the negligent fail-
ure to do so, is part of the 'management' of a flood control project. '73
Based upon this reasoning, the Court held that the Government was im-
mune from liability.
7 4
In addition, the Court specifically held that § 702(c) could be used to
bar recovery for personal injury claims against the Government. 75 Justice
70. See James, 478 U.S. at 597, 604-12 (analyzing language and purpose of
§ 702(c)). One of the most confusing parts of the James decision was the conclu-
sion the Court made that the phrase "management of a flood control facility" in-
cluded the manner in which the operator conveyed warnings to the public. Id. at
610. The Court determined that this even included the negligent failure to do so.
Id.
71. Id. at 605. The Supreme Court found these words to be unambiguous.
Id.
72. Id. at 609-10. The alleged mismanagement by government employees was
in their failure to post warnings of the danger from the current caused by the open
flood gates. Id. at 597.
73. Id. at 610. This conclusion caused confusion and inconsistent holdings
among the circuits. Compare Fryman v. United States, 901 F.2d 79, 81 (7th Cir.
1990) (finding that "management" language used in James decision was too broad
to be applied literally), with McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir.
1988) (applying James "management" language literally to bar suit by recreational
user who was paralyzed after diving into shallow flood control lake because no
signs had been posted warning of danger). For further discussion of the confusion
caused by the James decision, see supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
74. James, 478 U.S. at 612. The Court stated: "We therefore follow the plain
language of § 702c, a section of the 1928 Act that received careful consideration by
Congress and that has remained unchanged for nearly 60 years, and hold that the
Federal Government is immune from suit in this type of case." Id.
75. Id. at 605. The Court stated:
On its face, this language [contained in the statute] covers the accidents
here....
Although the Court of Appeals found .. . that the word "damage"
was ambiguous because it might refer only to damage to property and
exclude damage to persons, the ordinary meaning of the word carries no
such limitation. Damages "have historically been awarded both for injury
to property and injury to the person-a fact too well-known to have been
overlooked by the Congress .... Moreover, Congress' choice of the
language "any damage" and "liability of any kind" further undercuts a
narrow construction.
Id. at 604-05 (citations omitted); see also Levine, supra note 7, at 236 (noting that
majority in James held that § 702(c) bars recovery for personal injury claims).
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Powell, writing for the majority, stated that "'In the absence of a clearly
expressed legislative intention to the contrary,' the language of the statute
itself 'must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive"' and found that to the
plain meaning of the statute, damage would include personal injuries. 76
The extension of the immunity provision to cover personal injuries has
greatly added to the difficulty experienced by the circuit courts when at-
tempting to interpret and apply James in later cases.
2. Circuit Court Application of the Immunity Provision Since James
The application of James to later circuit decisions resulted in a split
among the courts. 77 The Ninth Circuit elected to follow the James deci-
sion and its previous decisions on this issue that were consistent with
James.78 In the Ninth Circuit, government immunity applied when one of
the purposes of the Act authorizing the project at issue was flood con-
trol. 79 It followed that if the purpose of the Act was flood control, than
the injury could not be "wholly unrelated" to any Act of Congress authoriz-
The dissent severely criticized the majority's position on the definition of
damage under the statute. James, 478 U.S. at 614-18 (Stevens, J. dissenting). The
dissent's main point was that the statute contained the word "damage" and not
"damages" as the majority suggested. Id. at 616 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dis-
sent noted, "The word 'damage' traditionally describes a harm to property (hence
'property damage'), rather than harm to the person (usually referred to as 'per-
sonal injury')." Id. at 614 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent further stated that
this understanding of the word "damage" was the preferred definition around the
time Congress drafted the Act. Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting). The dissent concluded
therefore, that the authorities that the majority relied on to support its conclusion
that the statute covered personal injuries did not apply to this situation because
the word in the statute was "damage" and not "damages." Id. at 615-16 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Even the authorities used by the majority differentiated between the
meanings for the two words. Id. at 616 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent con-
cluded that "[tihe Court thus provides no basis for thinking that Congress used
damage other than in its common, preferred usage to mean property damage. If
'plain meaning' is our polestar, the immunity provision does not bar respondents'
personal injury suits." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a more detailed discussion
of both the majority and dissent's positions on this issue, see Levine, supra note 7,
at 236-39.
76. James, 478 U.S. at 606 (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
77. See Fryman, 901 F.2d at 82 (applying James and holding that § 702(c)
would bar suit if flood control activities increased probability of injury); Boyd v.
United States, 881 F.2d 895, 900 (10th Cir. 1989) (considering application ofJames
and holding that there must be link between flood control activities and injuries
before § 702(c) would bar plaintiffs suit); McCarthy, 850 F.2d at 862 (applying
James and holding that § 702(c) barred plaintiffs suit unless injuries were "wholly
unrelated" to any act of Congress authorizing expenditures of federal funds for
flood control); see also Hiersche v. United States, 503 U.S. 923, 925 (1992) (mem.)
(describing split among circuits but leaving it to Congress to resolve).
78. See, e.g., McCarthy, 850 F.2d at 562 (holding consistently with previous
Ninth Circuit decisions that government is immune unless injury is wholly unre-
lated to flood control).
79. Id.; see Hiersche, 503 U.S. at 925 (describing how different circuits have
handled issue and stating that "in the Ninth Circuit, if flood control was one of the
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ing expenditures for flood control.8 0
In McCarthy v. United States,8 ' the plaintiff dove into Lake Lewisville, a
federal flood control project in Texas, and broke his neck when his head
struck the bottom of the lake.82 The plaintiff claimed that the Govern-
ment was liable because it failed to post warning signs and encouraged
swimming and diving knowing of the danger.83 Relying on James and pre-
vious decisions, the Ninth Circuit found no difference between personal
injury and property damage and held that § 702(c) immunity applied.8 4
The court stated that, "the immunity provision of §702c does not apply
when the damage or injury is 'wholly unrelated to any Act of Congress
authorizing expenditures of federal funds for flood control, or any act un-
dertaken pursuant to any such authorization.'- 8 5 The court held that be-
purposes of the act of Congress authorizing the project itself, the immunity
applies").
80. McCarthy, 850 F.2d at 663; Aetna Ins. Co. v. United States, 628 F.2d 1201,
1203 (9th Cir. 1980).
81. 850 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1988).
82. Id. at 559. The dam in McCarthy was constructed in connection with a
flood control project. Id. It was a multi-purpose project with recreation as one of
its uses. Id. McCarthy dove into waist deep water and fractured his neck, render-
ing him a quadriplegic. Id.
83. Id. at 559-60. McCarthy's complaint alleged that: the defendant con-
structed, maintained, operated and controlled the premises; the defendant had
observed but failed to prohibit swimming and diving at that location; the premises
were dangerous and defective in several particularly described respects; and the
defendant knew of the dangers but, despite such knowledge, encouraged the pub-
lic to dive there without any warnings of the danger. Id. The facts of the case show
that the construction maintenance and operation of the parks around the perime-
ter of the lake by the Army Corps of Engineers was authorized by a statute, 16
U.S.C. § 460d (1982), and that the Park where plaintiff was injured did not have a
designated swimming area. Id.
84. Id. at 561. The court specifically pointed out the James court's broad read-
ing of the statute and the way the statute "outlines immunity in sweeping terms."
Id. (citing James, U.S. at 605). The court relied on the definitions of "damages"
and "floodwaters" articulated in James to conclude that the injury here fell within
the statute. Id. An interesting ancillary argument which has not come up in other
cases was made by the injured party, McCarthy. Id. McCarthy tried to persuade
the court that his injury did not result from an active operation of the flood con-
trol facility and, therefore, is distinguishable from the injuries in James. Id. The
court rejected this argument, stating that the record indicated that there was ongo-
ing monitoring and discharge of water levels at the lake where McCarthy was in-
jured and this may be considered active flood control operations. Id. The court
further stated: "Given the difficulty of distinguishing between the active and pas-
sive operations of federal flood control facilities, particularly since a passive condi-
tion is invariably the result of other active forces which have gone before, we
decline to adopt the distinction urged by McCarthy." Id.
85. Id. at 562 (quoting Peterson v. United States, 367 F.2d 271, 275 (9th Cir.
1966)); see also Dawson v. United States, 894 F.2d 70, 74 (3d Cir. 1990) (following
Ninth Circuit's "wholly unrelated" test as appropriate way to determine § 702(c)
immunity). Dawson was a consolidation of two cases in which swimmers drowned
in a federal flood control project. Id. at 72. In the first case, the victim was swim-
ming at the Somerfield North Recreation area of Youghiogheny Lake, when he
suddenly disappeared. Id. His body was found later after a search. Id. In the
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cause Congress authorized the project in McCarthy for flood control
purposes and injury was related to the use of that project, the Government
was immune from liability for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff under
§ 702 (c). 8 6 In McCarthy, the Ninth Circuit concluded that its "wholly unre-
lated" test, developed in pre-James cases, was consistent with its interpreta-
tion of the James decision. 87
The Eighth Circuit also determined that James was consistent with its
previous decisions.88 In Zavadil v. United States,89 the plaintiff sued the
United States for negligence after he broke his neck by hitting a sub-
merged concrete boat ramp while diving into Lake Lewis and Clark, part
of a federal flood control project.90 The court noted that at the time of
the plaintiffs accident the Government was monitoring the water level in
the lake for flood control and navigational purposes. 9 1 The Zavadil court
relied on James and Ninth Circuit decisions and concluded that, " [s]ince
governmental control of these waters was a substantial factor in causing
the Zavadils' injuries the United States is immune from liability."9 2 The
court adhered to its "substantial factor test" but also relied on and fol-
second case, another recreational user was swimming in the same area when he
disappeared in eighteen feet of water. Id. The court examined the different ap-
proaches taken by the various circuits and concluded that the Ninth Circuit's
"wholly unrelated" test was the correct interpretation of James. Id. at 73-84. The
court stated it was aware of the confusion and difficulty in trying to apply the stat-
ute, however, it stated that it must reach a result that was consistent with James. Id.
at 73 n.2. The Dawson court held that the plaintiffs were barred from recovery
against the United States because their injuries could not be found to be "wholly
unrelated" to flood control. Id. at 73.
86. McCarthy, 850 F.2d at 562-63 (finding that Lake Lewisville was con-
structed under River and Harbor Act of 1945 in interest of flood control, court
concluded that immunity could apply).
87. Id. at 562; see Morici Corp. v. United States, 681 F.2d 645, 646 (9th Cir.
1982) (stating immunity statute would not apply when damage was "wholly unre-
lated" to any act of Congress authorizing expenditure of federal funds for flood
control); Pierce v. United States, 650 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1981) (same); Aetna
v. United States, 628 F.2d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 1980) (same); Peterson v. United
States, 367 F.2d 271, 275 (9th Cir. 1966) (same).
88. See, e.g., Zavadil v. United States, 908 F.2d 334, 335-36 (8th Cir. 1990)(stating that James was controlling and then reiterating "substantial factor" test de-
veloped prior to James decision).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 335. The lake in Zavadil was formed by the Gavins Point Dam which
was built and operated by the Government. Id.
91. Id. at 336. Having determined this, the court concluded that the lake's
waters were contained in a federal flood control project for purposes of or related
to flood control as per the James opinion. Id.
92. Id.; see also Henderson v. United States, 965 F.2d 1488, 1492 (8th Cir.
1992) (applying substantial factor test but finding that Government's control of
flood waters was not "substantial factor" in causing death of recreational fisherman
who was swept away by flood waters released by Government because waters were
released to generate hydroelectric power and not to control flooding); Dewitt
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 878 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1989) (using substantial
factor test to determine when § 702(c) immunity attaches in case of swimmer who
was paralyzed after diving into flood control lake and striking his head on bottom).
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lowed the analysis set out in James.93
In 1994, in the case of Fisher v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,94
the Eighth Circuit again faced the issue of whether § 702(c) immunity
applies in cases involving personal injury rather than property damage
caused by government negligence in the operation of a multi-purpose
flood control facility.95 The Fisher court followed Zavadil and concluded
that the Government was immune.9 6 The dissent created some doubt,
however, as to how the Eighth Circuit might handle these cases in the
future. 97 The dissent argued that the court should perform a more thor-
ough analysis of the immunity provision's application to cases involving
personal injury caused by government negligence in designated recrea-
tional areas of flood control projects. 98
The dissenting opinion in Fisher is not without support from other
circuit court decisions.99 The Tenth Circuit has not closely followed the
Supreme Court's decision in James or the Ninth Circuit's interpreta-
tion. 10 0 In Boyd v. United States,'01 the Tenth Circuit dealt with the appli-
cation of § 702(c) to a case involving personal injury allegedly caused by
government negligence in the operation of a flood control facility. 10 2 In
Boyd, a recreational boat hit and killed the plaintiffs husband who was
93. Zavadi4 908 F.2d at 336.
94. 31 F.3d 683 (8th Cir. 1994).
95. Id. at 684. In Fisher, the plaintiff was swimming and diving in a designated
recreational area of a flood control reservoir owned and operated by the Army
Corp of Engineers. Id. No lifeguard was present, and the shallow areas were not
marked. Id. The plaintiff dove into shallow water, hit his head on either a sub-
merged object or the bottom of the reservoir and broke his neck. Id. The plaintiff
sued the government, alleging that the government was negligent in its operation
of the recreational area because it failed to post warning signs, provide a lifeguard,
check the shifting profile of the bottom of the reservoir or ban swimming at the
reservoir. Id.
96. Id. at 685. The court applied the substantial factor test to this case as it
had previously done in ZavadiL Id. at 684. The court reasoned that Fisher was
injured after diving into shallow water at a reservoir and that the shallow water was
a result of the government's operation of that flood control project. Id. at 685.
Therefore, the court concluded that "governmental control of flood waters was a
substantial factor in causing Fisher's injuries and the government is immune from
liability under section 702c." Id.
97. See id. (Gibson, J., dissenting) (suggesting that court probe more deeply
into application of statute to recreational use).
98. Id. (Gibson, J., dissenting). The dissent believed that in this case, flood
control purposes had nothing to do with the accident, that the accident occurred
due to use of the reservoir for recreational purposes and, therefore, the govern-
ment should not be immune. Id. (Gibson, J., dissenting).
99. See Boyd v. United States Army, Corps of Eng'rs, 881 F.2d 895 (10th Cir.
1989) (holding that § 702(c) immunity does not apply in recreational injury
cases).
100. See id. at 900 ("[W]e cannot agree that Congress intended to stretch the
shield of flood control immunity to the limits contemplated by the 'wholly unre-
lated' standard.").
101. Id.
102. Id. at 896.
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snorkeling in Tenkiller Lake, part of a flood control project also desig-
nated as a state park.10 3 The Tenth Circuit took note of the statute's
broad language as interpreted by the Supreme Court, but declined to
agree with the "wholly unrelated" test developed from it by the Ninth
Circuit. 1
04
The court stated that § 702(c) immunity was created to protect the
Government from liability associated with flood control, not liability asso-
ciated with the operation of a recreational facility. 10 5 The Tenth Circuit
required a sufficient nexus between the injury and flood control activities
before the immunity provision would attach, but it declined to specify
every conceivable situation in which the link could be established. 10 6
103. Id. at 896, 899. The plaintiff alleged that the area of the lake in which
her husband was snorkling was held out to be, and generally known to be used for,
swimming, diving and snorkeling. Id. The plaintiff sued the government alleging
that it was negligent in failing to warn swimmers in the area that boats were permit-
ted or, alternatively, that it was negligent in not zoning the area so as to restrict the
entry of boats. Id. at 896.
104. Id. at 900. The court stated, "There is some broad language in James, but
the Court appeared to distinguish cases where damages occur in waters not being
actively used for flood control purposes, by twice noting that the district and appel-
late courts in that case had found that the waters were being released for flood
control purposes at the time of the accident." Id. (citation omitted). It was this
language in James that led the Tenth Circuit to conclude that the "wholly unre-
lated" test was too broad an interpretation ofJames. Id. The Tenth Circuit in Boyd
stated:
[W]e cannot agree that Congress intended to stretch the shield of flood
control immunity to the limits contemplated by the 'wholly unrelated'
standard. This standard essentially creates a 'but for' connection be-
tween flood control activity and damages occurring at a flood control
project .... Such a connection between flood control activity and recrea-
tional injuries is too attenuated to warrant the invocation of section
702(c).
Id. The court further stated that there had been no evidence presented to show
that Congress intended § 702(c) to cover the situation in Boyd Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.; see also Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1004 (10th Cir. 1995)
(following Boyd and requiring that there be link between flood control activities at
project and injuries suffered by plaintiffs before § 702(c) would bar recovery); Wil-
liams v. United States, 957 F.2d 742, 744-45 (10th Cir. 1992) (setting up two step
test for application of § 702(c)). The Williams two part test is as follows: (1)
whether there is flood control project that triggers Act and (2) if nexus exists be-
tween flood control activities and injuries sustained. Id.
Holt is the most recent Tenth Circuit decision on this issue and it continues to
follow the holding in Boyd. Holt, 46 F.3d at 1005. In Holt, the plaintiff's parents
were killed when their car slid on ice that formed on the highway as a result of
government employees' negligence. Id. at 1002. The employees released flood
waters from a nearby dam and then failed to clear the hazard on the roadway
caused by the frozen water. Id. The court held that the there was a sufficient
nexus between the flood control activity, release of flood waters which froze on the
highway, and the injury, death as a result of the car skidding on the ice, so that the
government would be immune from this suit. Id. at 1005.
In Williams, the Tenth Circuit, in addition to supporting the nexus test created
in Boyd, rejected the broad language asserted in James regarding the definition of
floodwaters under the statute. Williams, 957 F.2d at 744. The court stated: "Immu-
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The Tenth Circuit stands alone in its approach to § 702(c) immunity,
although the Fourth Circuit has indicated that it may eventually follow the
Tenth Circuit's analysis.10 7 The Fourth Circuit, however, has not ad-
dressed this issue since its holding in Hayes v. United States, decided in
1978. As previously discussed, the Hayes case involved property damage
that was the result of alleged governmental negligence in the operation of
flood gates at a flood control facility.108 The court was concerned with the
purpose of the operation of the facility and concluded that if the damage
was shown to have been caused by the operation of the facility for recrea-
tional purposes and not flood control, § 702(c) would not protect the
Government from liability.10 9
The Seventh Circuit got its post-James opportunity to address this issue
in Fryman v. United States.110 In Fryman, the plaintiff struck his head on an
unidentified submerged hazard while diving into Lake Shelbyville, a flood
control project also used for recreation.11  The plaintiff was a
quadriplegic as a result of this accident. 12 The Seventh Circuit discussed
the James decision and stated, "James was so broadly written that it cannot
nity under the Act as interpreted in James depends not on the character or origin
of the water, but on the purpose of the project and the nature of the activity creat-
ing the nexus with the injury." Id. The court felt an approach which elevated the
character of the water over the purpose of the dam would lead to absurd results.
Id. The court gave the example that:
[A] drop of water at the head of the Colorado River that was impounded in
or that passed through a flood control project would thereby become flood-
water, and would immunize the government from all liability for injury
caused by that drop of water or any water with which it commingled, all
the way from the headwaters to the Gulf of Mexico.... This logic would
provide immunity without analysis beyond finding the drop of water pass-
ing through a flood control project.
Id. (emphasis added). The court therefore, set up the first prong of its test which
was whether the flood control project was one which triggered the immunity provi-
sion of the Act. Id.
107. See Hayes v. United States, 585 F.2d 701, 702-03 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding
plaintiff may be able to avoid absolute bar of § 702(c) if his injury was result of
operation of project as recreational facility without regard to its flood control
aspects).
108. Id. The plaintiff brought suit after a nearby riverbank eroded and his
farm was flooded. Id. at 702. The plaintiff's farm was located downstream from a
flood control facility and the plaintiff alleged that the damages were caused be-
cause of the negligent operation of the facility's flood gates. Id.
109. Id.
110. 901 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1990).
111. Id. at 80. The plaintiff and his brother were swimming in a federal flood
control facility which was used for boating, waterskiing, swimming and fishing in
addition to flood control. Id. at 79.
112. Id. at 80. The plaintiff brought suit against the Government alleging that
it acted negligently and maliciously in not posting warning signs or closing the
water to recreation. Id. He claimed his injury was inflicted by a combination of
the hidden object and the failure of the Corps to warn him. Id. at 80-81.
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be applied literally."1 13 The Seventh Circuit also concluded that the
Tenth Circuit's holding in Boyd was too narrow. 114 Therefore, the Seventh
Circuit developed its own test that falls somewhere between James and
Boyd. 1 5 The Seventh Circuit determined that the immunity provision ap-
plied if the flood control activities of the project increased the probability
of injuries such as those experienced by the plaintiff in Fryman.1 16 In
Fryman's case, the court granted immunity based on its own test, holding
specifically that "flood control activities [at the lake] increased [the]
probability that [the] diver would suffer injury."' 17
The Fifth Circuit, the circuit by which Boudreau is bound, has little
precedent on this issue."l 8 The Fifth Circuit has followed the Ninth Cir-
cuit and the James decisions. 1 19 In Mocklin v. Orleans Levee District,12 0 the
plaintiffs were the parents of a young boy who drowned in a lake which
was being dredged to make flotation channels.' 2 1 The plaintiffs sued the
Government, claiming that the dredging caused their son's death.' 22 The
113. Id. at 81. The court gave the example of what a literal interpretation of
the "management" language would look like. Id. The court stated,
The "management of a flood control project" includes building roads to
reach the beaches and hiring staff to run the project. If the Corps of
Engineers should allow a walrus-sized pothole to swallow tourists' cars on
the way to the beach, or if a tree-trimmer's car should careen through
some picnickers, these injuries would be "associated with" flood control.
They would occur within the boundaries of the project, and but for the
effort to curtail flooding the injuries would not have happened. Yet they
would have nothing to do with management of flood waters, and it is
hard to conceive that they are "damage from or by floods or flood waters"
within the scope of §702(c).
Id. at 81.
114. Id. In Boyd, the Tenth Circuit held that § 702(c) immunity did not apply
at all to liability associated with the operation of a recreational facility. Boyd v.
United States, 881 F.2d 895, 900 (10th Cir. 1989). The Seventh Circuit did not
accept the Tenth Circuit's reasoning and stated that if the Tenth Circuit was cor-
rect, "then James was wrong on its own facts, for it grew out of recreational boating,
and in James no less than in Boyd, the deaths could have been prevented by closing
the lake to recreational boating." Fryman, 901 F.2d at 81.
115. See Fryman, 901 F.2d at 82 (rejecting both Boyd andJames approaches and
stating its test as to when § 702(c) would apply).
116. Id.; see also Bailey v. United States, 35 F.3d 1118, 1124 (7th Cir. 1994)
(following Fryman and stating "[i]f... evidence establishes that the flood control
activities or characteristics of [the flood control project] ... rendered injuries...
more likely than they would be in a non-flood control lake, then ... Fryman would
entitle the government to immunity").
117. Fryman, 901 F.2d at 79.
118. For a discussion of Fifth Circuit precedent on this issue, see infra note
201 and accompanying text.
119. See Mocklin v. Orleans Levee Dist., 877 F.2d 427, 430 (5th Cir. 1989)
(following both Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit decisions).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 428. The lake was being dredged so that barges with the necessary
supplies to construct levees along the lake could get through. Id.
122. Id. The plaintiffs claimed their child slipped from a sand bar caused by
the dredging into one of the flotation channels and drowned. Id.
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debate in Mocklin centered around whether the injury was caused "by or
from floods or flood waters" as § 702(c) required.' 23 The court con-
cluded that the channels were part of a flood control project, and, there-
fore, the Government was immune. 124 The court relied on the James
decision that held if the project was a flood control project then all the
waters contained in it were flood waters. 125 Because all the waters were
flood waters within the meaning of the statute, the immunity provision
covered any liability caused by these waters.
126
As the Fifth Circuit was confronted with the case of Boudreau v. United
States, it is apparent that it had some background on this issue upon which
to rely.127 It is also evident, however, that that background has not pro-
duced a consistent rule for the courts to follow.' 28 The statute and its
legislative history show a strong intent by Congress to protect citizens from
flood damage but at the same time show Congress's desire to immunize
the United States from any liability associated with flood control facili-
ties.129 The only Supreme Court case on this issue, United States v.
James,'30 has caused confusion among the Courts of Appeals.lS3 Addition-
ally, there was very little case law in the Fifth Circuit to help guide the
Boudreau court in its decision.' 3 2 Against this backdrop, the Fifth Circuit
123. Id. at 429-30.
124. Id. at 430.
125. Id. at 429-30. The court in Mocklin concluded that the flotation channel
in which the plaintiffs alleged the drowning occurred properly can be said to con-
tain water related to flood control and, therefore, the channels were inescapably
part of a flood control project. Id.
126. Id.
127. For a complete discussion of the cases and legislative history leading up
to the decision in Boudreau, see supra notes 26-126 and accompanying text.
128. For a description of the background leading up to the Boudreau decision
and the inconsistent rulings handed down by the circuit courts, see supra notes 67-
126 and accompanying text.
129. 69 CONG. Rsc. 6641 (1928) (remarks of Rep. Snell). For further discus-
sion of the legislative history of the Act, see supra notes 25-35 and accompanying
text.
130. 478 U.S. 597 (1986).
131. See, e.g., Zavadil v. United States, 908 F.2d 334 (8th Cir. 1992) (interpret-
ingJames and holding that § 702(c) immunity applied when governmental control
of waters was "substantial factor" in bringing about injuries); Fryman v. United
States, 901 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1990) (interpreting James and holding that § 702(c)
applied if flood control activities at project "increased the probability" of injuries
sustained by plaintiff); Boyd v. United States, 881 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1989) (inter-
preting James and holding that "but for" connection between flood control activity
and recreational injuries was not what James intended and that statute was not
designed to protect Government from liability associated with recreational facil-
ity); McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1988) (interpreting James
and holding that § 702(c) immunity applied unless injuries were "wholly unre-
lated" to flood control).
132. See Mocklin v. Orleans Levee Dist., 877 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1989) (provid-
ing only Fifth Circuit decision on point afterJames). For a further discussion of the
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considered Boudreau v. United States.'33
III. FACrS
In Boudreau v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the Flood Control Act of 1928
provided the United States with immunity from liability for the alleged
negligence of the Coast Guard Auxiliary in attempting to tow a stranded
recreational vessel on a flood control lake.13 4 The flood control project in
this case was a multi-purpose project, and at the time of the injury, the
lake was being used for recreational purposes. 135
On July 5, 1992, Mr. Daniel Boudreau and a friend took Boudreau's
boat out on Lake Lewisville located in Denton County, Texas. 136 The pair
experienced engine trouble and called the Coast Guard Auxiliary for
assistance, who told them to anchor the boat.13 7 Upon arrival the Coast
Guard gave instructions and secured a tow line.' 38 While the Coast
Guard attempted to tow the boat, Boudreau was severely injured.' 3 9 The
government and Boudreau disputed whether the conditions on the lake
contributed to the accident.' 40 Boudreau claimed that the immunity pro-
vision of § 702(c) did not apply because the Coast Guard Auxiliary's re-
sponsibilities on the lake consisted only of water safety management and
133. 53 F.3d 81 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 771 (1996).
134. Id. at 82.
135. Id. at 84. Many of the projects involved in these types of cases are multi-
purpose projects. See McCarthy, 850 F.2d at 559 ("Lewisville Lake [where the acci-
dent occurred in Boudreau] is a multi-purpose project lake that has flood control as
one of its purposes."); see also Dewitt Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 878 F.2d
246, 246 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating Merisach Lake, which was used as dam as well as
beach, was multi-purpose project).
Multi-purpose means that the project may have been established for flood
control purposes but it is now being used for other purposes in addition to flood
control. "It is the policy of the Corps [of engineers] to manage the flood control
projects in a manner that allows for recreational use." Dawson v. United States,
894 F.2d 70, 72 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing 36 C.F.R. § 327.1 (1988)). See, e.g., Fyman,
901 F.2d at 80 ("The lake [where the accident occurred] was created between 1963
and 1970 as part of a flood control project, and like many other artificial bodies of
water was put to recreational use."). At the time Mr. Boudreau was injured, he was
using Lake Lewisville for recreational purposes. Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 82.
136. Boudreau, 55 F.3d at 82.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 82 n.2. Observing that winds were at least 30 knots, with waters of
three to four feet, the Coast Guard vessel operator, Thomas Spalding, directed
Boudreau and his friend to put on life jackets. Id.
139. Id. "After securing a tow line, [Boudreau was instructed by the Coast
Guard] to either lift anchor or cut the anchor line." Id. Boudreau attempted to
lift the anchor. Id. While doing so, the anchor line broke free and swung into
Boudreau's leg, causing severe injury. Id.
140. Id. at 82 n.3. "The Government maintains that the anchor line broke
free when the wind and waves [of lake Lewisville] hit the SIMPLE PLEASURE
[Coast Guard Boat], causing it to turn sharply and pull the tow line. Boudreau
denies that the conditions on the Lake contributed to the accident." Id.
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were, therefore, unrelated to flood control. 14 1 The Fifth Circuit dis-
agreed and affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Northern
District of Texas. 14 2 The district court held that the Government was im-
mune from any liability associated with Boudreau's accident, specifically
determining that the Coast Guard Auxiliary's activity was "associated with
flood control."143 The Fifth Circuit based its decision on the only
Supreme Court precedent available and on decisions of several other cir-
cuits that dealt with similar issues."14
IV. ANALYSIS
This Part provides both a narrative and a critical analysis of the
Boudreau decision. Section A of this Part discusses the majority and dis-
senting opinions in Boudreau.14 5 Section B analyzes the Boudreau opinion
in relation to other court opinions and concludes that the better reasoned
opinion is that of the Tenth Circuit, and therefore, Boudreau was incor-
rectly decided. 146
A. The Analysis of the Boudreau court
1. The Majority Opinion
In Boudreau v. United States, the Fifth Circuit examined the application
of § 702(c) of the Flood Control Act of 1928 to a personal injury claim
against the Government arising out of the recreational use of a flood con-
trol lake. 14 7 The court began its analysis by looking to the statute and the
wording of § 702 (c).14 8 The pertinent text states: "No liability of any kind
141. Id. at 84. Boudreau based this argument on a portion of the Supreme
Court opinion James which stated, "' [i]f the plaintiff could prove damage ... as a
result of the dams operation as a recreational facility without relation to the operation
of the dam as a flood control project, he would avoid the absolute bar of § 702c."' Id.
(quoting United States v.James, 478 U.S. 597, 605 n.7 (1986)). Boudreau argued
that the Coast Guard's activities had to do with the recreational use of the Lake
and not flood control. Id.
142. Id. at 84-86.
143. Id. at 84. "Relying on James, the district court concluded that the Auxil-
iary's management of the flood control lake established the requisite nexus be-
tween Boudreau's injury and flood control." Id. at 84.
144. See generally id. (basing its decision on consideration of the decision in
James and decisions of Ninth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits).
145. For a discussion of the majority and dissenting opinions in Boudreau, see
infra notes 148-99 and accompanying text.
146. For a discussion of the analysis of the Boudreau decision and its relation
to other circuit decisions, see infra notes 203-31 and accompanying text.
147. Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 82. An ancillary issue involving whether Lake Lewis-
ville was a flood control lake was settled when the plaintiff conceded the point. Id.;
see also McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that
Lake Lewisville is flood control lake). This was a threshold issue because applica-
bility of the immunity provision is contingent on the injury having occurred "from
or by floods or flood waters." See 33 U.S.C. § 702(c) (1994) (requiring that dam-
age be "from or by floods or flood waters" before immunity provision will apply).
148. Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 82.
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shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by
floods or flood waters at any place .... -149 The court applied the lan-
guage of the statute to the facts of Boudreau and concluded that the issue
before it was whether Boudreau's injuries were "from or by ... flood wa-
ters."150 In order to resolve this issue, the court looked to its previous
decision in Mocklin v. Orleans Levee District and the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States v. James.151 The Fifth Circuit noted that in James, the
Supreme Court interpreted § 702 (c) broadly on the basis of the language
and legislative history of the statute. 15 2 The court stated, "[i]ndeed, the
Court observed in James that '[i]t is difficult to imagine broader lan-
guage.'"15 The court then noted, however, that there was disagreement
among the circuits regarding the application of § 702(c), notwithstanding
the James decision.154 The Fifth Circuit then concluded that based on the
specific facts of the case and the Supreme Court precedent, there was a
sufficient association between the Coast Guard Auxiliary's activities and
flood control to justify government immunity. 155
The most important facet of the court's reasoning was its reliance on
the Supreme Court's conclusion in James, that "'management of a flood
control project"' was to be included "within the ambit of activity associated
with flood control."1 56 The appellant challenged this conclusion by argu-
149. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 702(c)).
150. Id. at 82-83. Before continuing its discussion of the issue presented, the
court gave a framework for its analysis. Id. at 83. The court stated: "Guiding our
decision is the general principle that 'no action lies against the United States un-
less the legislature has authorized it.' Concomitantly, there must be a 'clear relin-
quishment of sovereign immunity to give jurisdiction for tort actions."' Id.
quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 30-31 (1953)).
151. Id.; see Mocklin v. Orleans Levee Dist., 877 F.2d 427, 428-29 (5th Cir.
1989) (relying on United States v.James, 478 U.S. 597 (1986) and broad reading
of statute by Supreme Court in that case).
152. Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 83. The Fifth Circuit further stated: "The breadth
of the Court's interpretation of § 702(c) is undeniable." Id.
153. Id. (quoting United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 604 (1986)).
154. Id. at 83; see Hiersche v. United States, 503 U.S. 923 (1992) (noting split
among circuits but refusing to settle it). The Fifth Circuit then gave three exam-
ples of this split using the Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits. Boudreau, 53 F.3d at
84. The court acknowledged that the Ninth Circuit applied the "wholly unrelated"
test to determine when § 702(c) immunity applied and that the Tenth Circuit, in
Boyd v. United States, 881 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1989), would not "stretch the shield of
flood control immunity to the limits contemplated by that test." Id. (citation omit-
ted). The court also noted the Seventh Circuit's increased probability test which
was utilized by the Bailey court. Id. For a further discussion of the Seventh Cir-
cuit's test, see supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
155. Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 85. The court stated that in the Fifth Circuit, such a
decision was to be based on a fact specific analysis. Id. at 83 (citing Mocklin v.
Orleans Levee Dist., 877 F.2d 427, 429-30 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying fact-specific
analysis)).
156. Id. at 84. The Supreme Court in James stated that "'the manner in which
to convey warnings, including the negligent failure to do so, is part of the "man-
agement" of a flood control project."' Id. at 84 n.10 (quoting James, 478 U.S. at
610).
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ing that the Coast Guard Auxiliary's responsibilities on the lake were unre-
lated to flood control because they only involved water safety
management. 15 7 In making this argument, the appellant relied on a foot-
note in James citing a case that the court noted appeared to support
Boudreau's argument. 158 The court explicitly rejected this argument,
however, stating that the footnote was internally inconsistent. 159 The
court also reasoned that Boudreau could not rely on the footnote because
it was in reference to whether the waters, at issue in James, "clearly [fell]
within the ambit of the statute and it did not concern when immunity
would not bar liability for injury from flood waters.' 160 As additional sup-
port for its conclusion, the Fifth Circuit analogized its factual situation to
that of the James case. 16 ' The court reasoned that the "creation of the
flood control project resulted in the Army Corp of Engineers being re-
sponsible for providing water safety patrols at the Lake."162 The Corps of
Engineers fulfilled that responsibility by reaching an agreement with the
Coast Guard to perform that function. 163 The court concluded that the
case before it was very similar to the James case because in each case the
In James, actions were brought against the United States to recover for the
deaths of recreational boaters who drowned when they were swept through dis-
charge points of reservoirs on federal flood control projects after discharge gates
were opened, without warning, to alleviate potential flooding. James, 478 U.S. at
597. The James court found the Government immune from liability, concluding
that the negligent failure of the Government employees to warn recreational users
of the dangers was part of the "management" of a flood control project. Id. at 609-
10.
"Relying on James, the district court [in Boudreau] concluded that the Auxil-
iary's management of the flood control lake established the requisite nexus be-
tween Boudreau's injury and flood control." Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 84. The district
court based its decision "on the fact that the alleged negligence was by the Coast
Guard Auxiliary, which is part of the government's management of Lake Lewisville
and serves to control the waters in a variety of capacities." Id. The Fifth Circuit
relied upon the district court's reasoning in concluding that the Coast Guard Aux-
iliary was involved in the "management" of a flood control project at the time the
injury occurred and, therefore, the government was immune. Id. at 86.
157. Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 86.
158. Id. at 84. Boudreau relied on footnote seven of the James opinion con-
taining a string cite which included the decision of the Fourth Circuit in Hayes v.
United States, 585 F.2d 701, 702-03 (1978). Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 84. The parentheti-
cal following the cite quoted a portion of the Hayes decision which read: "If the
plaintiff could prove damage ... as a result of the dam's operation as a recrea-
tional facility without relation to the operation of the dam as a flood control pro-
ject, he would avoid the absolute bar of section 702(c)." Id.
159. Id. at 85. In the same footnote, the Supreme Court also cited Morici v.
United States, 681 F.2d 645, 647-48 (9th Cir. 1982), for the proposition that immu-
nity is available unless the Government's activity is "wholly unrelated" to flood con-
trol. Id. Morici specifically rejected the Hayes approach. Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 84
(citing Morici, 681 F.2d at 647-48). This contradiction made the footnote appear
internally inconsistent to the Fifth Circuit. Id.
160. Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 84.
161. Id. at 85.
162. Id.
163. Id. The court listed the relevant portion of the agreement as follows:
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Government's responsibilities toward the public arose because of the es-
tablishment of a flood control project, and in each case the Government's
activities were properly considered part of the "management of a flood
control project. 1 64
The final argument made by Boudreau was that even if the Coast
Guard's activities were part of the management of a flood control project,
Boudreau's specific injury was completely unrelated to flood control. 165
The Fifth Circuit again rejected Boudreau's argument, but noted that at
least one circuit, the Seventh Circuit, had suggested that "management of
a flood control project" may well be insufficient, standing alone, to allow
for § 702(c) immunity.1 66 The Fifth Circuit stated that even assuming that
the Seventh Circuit was correct and something more is required, Boudreau
would still meet the test for immunity.' 67 Since Boudreau's injury resulted
from a boating accident on flood control waters involving the govern-
ment's patrol of those waters, it was impossible for the Fifth Circuit to say
that Boudreau's injury had nothing to do with the "management" of flood
waters.1 68 The court added that the case was safely removed from the
realm of cases in which "management of a flood control project" would
not be enough to trigger § 702(c) immunity. 169 Therefore, the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas. 170
The Memorandum of Agreement between the Corps of Engineers and
Coast Guard reads in part:
1. Responsibility[.]
A. Both the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Coast
Guard are responsible for administering water safety programs on inland
lakes under their concurrent jurisdictions ....
2. Purpose of Agreement.
A. Recognizing the above responsibilities, it is hereby granted that
the purpose of this agreement is to facilitate water safety patrols by local
U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary ....
Id. at 85 n.14.
164. Id. at 85. The Fifth Circuit stated: "Therefore, just as, under the facts in
James, the Government had the responsibility to warn of dangerous water condi-
tions, the Government had the responsibility under the facts in this case to provide
water safety patrols." Id. For a more detailed description of the facts of the James
case, see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
165. Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 84. Boudreau's injury occurred while he was using
the lake for recreational purposes. Id. at 82. For the complete factual situation in
Boudreau, see supra notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
166. Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 85. The court referred to the Seventh Circuit's
opinion in Fryman v. United States, 901 F.2d 79, 81 (7th Cir. 1990). Boudreau, 53
F.3d at 85. The Seventh Circuit gave an example of when management of flood
control may not be enough to trigger § 702(c) immunity. Id. For the full state-
ment of the Seventh Circuit's example, see supra note 113.
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2. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting judge in Boudreau took a somewhat different approach
and relied more on statutory analysis to decide the case. 171 The dissent
began by analyzing the wording of § 702(c).172 The dissent recognized, as
did the majority, that the language of § 702(c) is very broad and that the
Supreme Court supported a broad reading of the language.' 7 3 The dis-
sent noted, however, that in James, the Supreme Court specifically empha-
sized the word "any" as being very broad.' 74 The dissent, therefore,
rejected the majority's over-reliance on the provision's broad language to
support its conclusion that Boudreau's injury was sufficiently related to
flood control.175 In rejecting the majority's conclusion, the dissent stated
that the Boudreau case did not turn on any language from § 702(c) that is
modified by the word "any."'176 The Boudreau case turned on whether the
damages were caused "from or by floods or flood waters."1 77 The legisla-
ture placed the word "any" in the provision in order to modify the kind of
damages covered by the provision, the kind of liability covered as well as
the places covered. 178 Therefore, the dissent argued, the majority was in-
corect to rely on the Supreme Court's declaration about the broadness of
this language because the Boudreau case did not turn on this particular
language. 1
79
The dissent then turned to what it deemed was the question at hand:
whether the damages to Boudreau were "from or by floods or flood wa-
171. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
172. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). "[A]s with any case involving the interpreta-
tion of a statute, our analysis must begin with the language of the statute itself." Id.
(Smith, J., dissenting) (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Remington, 442 U.S. 560, 568
(1979)).
173. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597,
604 (1986)). The dissent stated: "The Supreme Court acknowledged, and the ma-
jority emphasizes, the broad nature of this language [§ 702(c)]." Id. (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
174. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
175. See id. (Smith,J., dissenting) (arguing that Boudreau did not turn on lan-
guage modified by word "any" such as "any damage," "any kind [of liability]" or
"any place," it turned on whether injuries were "from or by floods or flood waters"
and, therefore, reliance on Supreme Court conclusion regarding statute's broad
sweeping language was inappropriate).
176. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
177. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
178. See 33 U.S.C. § 702(c) (1994) (specifically statute states, "any damage,"
"any kind [of liability]" and "any place"). The statute states: "No liability of any
kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by
floods or flood waters at any place .... Id. (emphasis added). The word "any"
was put into the statute to modify damage, kind of liability and place. Id. These
words were not at issue in Boudreau because Boudreau concerned whether the plain-
tiffs injuries were caused by flood waters. Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 86 (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
179. Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 86 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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ters."' 8 0 The dissent stated that it assumed that the circumstances of the
case involved "floods or flood waters" within the meaning of the statute so
that it could focus on the real disagreement, the meaning of "from or
by."18 1 Therefore, the only question remaining before the dissent was
whether the damage was caused by these waters. 182 The dissent con-
cluded that immunity under § 702(c) did not apply because, "there was no
reasonable construction of the plain language of this provision by which
the damage in this case was 'from or by' flood waters." 183 In reaching this
conclusion, the dissent relied heavily on the specific facts of the case. 184
The dissent did not dispute the fact that Boudreau's injury was the result
of a Coast Guard rescue attempt on a flood control lake. 185 The dissent,
however, asserted that water did not cause Boudreau's injury, except that
"but for" the existence of the water, Boudreau would not have been in-
jured.' 86 For the dissent, the "but for" connection was not strong enough
to trigger § 702(c) immunity.'8 7 The dissent stated, "[t]his type of con-
nection ... [was] too tenuous to be supported by a rational construction
of 'from or by."'aa The dissent criticized the majority's holding as too
broad on this point because the connection the majority relied on was
between Boudreau's injury and flood control, not the injury and flood
waters as the dissent believed the statute clearly required.' 8 9
The dissent's final criticism concerned the majority's reading of the
180. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the fact that the cir-
cumstances of Boudreau involved "floods or flood waters" might be disputed as it
had been in other similar cases. See Denham v. United States, 646 F. Supp. 1021,
1026-27 (W.D. Tex. 1986) (concluding that plaintiff's injury, sustained from flood
control project's use as recreational facility, was not subject to immunity provision
of § 702(c)), affd, 834 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1987); see also United States v.James, 478
U.S. 597, 605 n.7 (1986) (noting in Hayes decision that if plaintiff could show his
injuries were result of recreational facility operation and not flood control, he
would avoid the bar of§ 702(c), but also noting dispute about this in other circuit
cases).
182. Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 86 (Smith, J., dissenting). "The simple question is
whether the damages in this case were 'from or by floods or flood waters."' Id.
(Smith, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
183. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
184. See id. (Smith,J., dissenting) (looking specifically at how accident on lake
occurred and concluding that water had nothing to do with Boudreau's injury).
185. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). For a complete discussion of the facts of
Boudreau, see supra notes 135-45 and accompanying text.
186. Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 86 (Smith, J., dissenting).
187. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
188. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 86-87 (Smith, J., dissenting). The dissent stated: "The majority
admits [that the 'but for' connection is too tenuous] by holding that the relevant
nexus [required by the statute] is between the injury and 'flood control,' not flood
waters." Id. at 86 (Smith, J., dissenting). Section 702(c) reads: "No liability... for
damage from or byfloods orflood waters .. " 33 U.S.C. § 702(c) (1994) (emphasis
added). It does not include damage from flood control Id.
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Supreme Court opinion in James. 190 The majority concluded that if
Boudreau's injury was related to the management of a flood control pro-
ject, the Government was immune from liability.19 1 The dissent argued
that there was no language to support this conclusion in the statute and
that the majority gleaned its conclusion from a misreading of the James
decision. 192 The dissent noted that under the majority's reading of the
management language from James, the negligent failure to warn a motorist
of a road hazard, resulting in an accident within the confines of a recrea-
tional area that is part of a flood control project, would give rise to
§ 702(c) immunity because such a failure to warn is part of the "manage-
ment" of a flood control facility. 193 The dissent argued that the manage-
ment language of the James decision must be construed in light of the facts
of James and, therefore, not extended beyond those facts. 194 The dissent
noted that the James case passed over the threshold issue of whether the
injuries were caused by flood waters while the Boudreau case had not.19 5
The dissent criticized the majority for taking language from the James deci-
sion out of context and misapplying it in the Boudreau case. 19 6
The final point argued by the dissent was that the Supreme Court had
not rewritten the language of the statute through its decision in James, and
therefore, no court should construe the James decision as holding that the
statute now read that government immunity extended to, "any damage
related to the management of a federal flood control project."' 9 7 Such a
190. Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 87 (Smith, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 86.
192. See id. at 87 (Smith, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he word 'manage-
ment' appears nowhere in the relevant provision of § 702 (c)" and insinuating that
majority misread James Court's holding on this point). James involved the drown-
ing of recreational users of flood control projects after the users were swept
through retaining structures opened to release water to control flooding. United
States v. James, 478 U.S. 597 (1986). In James, it was clear that the accidents were
caused by flood waters, and therefore, the Supreme Court was not concerned with
the issue that faced the court in Boudreau. See Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 87 (Smith, J.,
dissenting) (determining issue was whether injuries were caused from or by floods
or flood waters which was not case in James where it was clear drownings were
caused by flood waters).
193. Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 87 (Smith, J., dissenting). The majority explicitly
rejected the contention that its holding would be extended as far as that suggested
by the Seventh Circuit in Fyman v. United States, 901 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1990).
Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 87. For the full text of the Seventh Circuit's example, see
supra note 113. After discussing the Seventh Circuit's example, the majority stated:
"In any event, if the foregoing represents an over-application of § 702c, the present
case is safely removed from that realm." Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 86.
194. Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 87 (Smith, J., dissenting).
195. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). "This threshold is simply not met in this
case." Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
196. Id. (Smith,J., dissenting). "This passage from James, [which contains the
management language relied on by the majority], must be construed in light of
the facts of James and the plain language of § 702(c)." Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
197. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). "[T]he Supreme Court acknowledged that
the language of 702(c) is broad: it did not indicate, however, that the provision
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reading would be incorrect according to the dissent.198 In the dissent's
opinion, the majority misread the statute and the James opinion leading it
to reach an incorrect holding.199
B. The Boudreau Court's Failure to Recognize the Harm of Outdated
Legislation and Its Disappointing Decision to Continue the Injustice.
In Boudreau, the Fifth Circuit was given the opportunity to speak di-
rectly and clearly on an issue that had caused controversy among the cir-
cuits. 20 0 There is little precedent in the Fifth Circuit concerning the issue
of the application of § 702(c) to cases where it is unclear whether the inju-
ries were caused "from or by flood waters" within the meaning of the stat-
ute.2 01 Therefore, the court wasted an opportunity to take a stand on the
issue and make clear how it would decide such cases in the future. The
court had a chance to forge a path toward change-to make a statement
regarding an antiquated statute-but instead it chose to fall in line with
the ranks.2 02 In light of the way the circuits have ruled on this issue, the
should be read as 'any damage related to the management of a federal flood con-
trol project."' Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
198. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
199. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
200. See Hiersche v. United States, 503 U.S. 923 (1992) (mem.) (discussing
split in circuits on application of § 702(c)). For a further discussion of how the
different circuits have applied § 702(c), see supra note 12, 77-126 and accompany-
ing text.
201. See, e.g., Mocklin v. Orleans Levee Dist., 877 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1989)
(existing as only Fifth Circuit case dealing with this issue after James). The early
cases in the Fifth Circuit dealt with property damage and were concerned with
issues such as whether § 702(c) covered all types of floods, natural and man-made.
See, e.g., Florida E. Coast Ry. Co. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1975)
(holding that § 702(c) covered damages from all floods not just from natural
floods). For a discussion of cases in other circuits which have also reached this
conclusion, see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
The only other Fifth Circuit case dealing with the § 702(c) immunity provi-
sion was Graa v. United States in which the court held did not involve damage
caused by flood waters from a flood control facility, and therefore, § 702(c) did
not apply. Graci v. United States, 456 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1971). For a further discus-
sion of the facts and reasoning in Grad, see supra note 41.
The only recent case in the Fifth Circuit to speak on this issue was much
clearer; there the court easily found the injuries were caused "from or by flood
waters" because the waters caused the victim to drown. Mocklin, 877 F.2d at 430.
202. Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 82 (affirming lower court's holding that United
States was immune from liability under § 702(c) for negligence of Coast Guard in
its safety measures on multi-purpose lake). The Boudreau court had the opportu-
nity to make a decision for the circuit on how it would stand on these types of cases
since there was no significant precedent on this issue in the Fifth Circuit. For a
further discussion of the lack of precedent in the Fifth Circuit, see supra note 201
and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit could have followed the Tenth Circuit
in its decision not to allow governmental immunity in cases where the damage or
injury was associated with the operation of waters in a recreational facility. Boyd v.
United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 881 F.2d 895, 900-01 (10th Cir. 1989). For a
further discussion of Boyd and the Tenth Circuit's rationale, see supra notes 101-06
and accompanying text. Instead, the Boudreau court chose to fit the case into the
1518 [Vol. 41: p. 1487
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Fifth Circuit's decision to affirm the district court's holding and follow the
majority of circuits is not surprising, but is nevertheless disappointing.
The Boudreau court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in
James and the reading of that opinion proffered by the Ninth Circuit and
followed by several other circuits. 203 As previously noted, the Ninth Cir-
cuit construed the James decision to require the application of government
immunity if the damage claimed was not "wholly unrelated" to flood con-
trol.20 4 The Fifth Circuit did not explicidy apply the "wholly unrelated"
test, but concluded that because James had included "management" of a
flood control facility within the ambit of activity associated with flood con-
trol, and the Coast Guard was performing those "management" functions,
there was a sufficient nexus between the injury and flood control to sup-
port governmental immunity. 20 5 Using Ninth Circuit terminology,
Boudreau's injury would not be considered "wholly unrelated" to flood
control.2 0 6 This analysis is not entirely sound. In James, the Court stated
that the failure to convey warnings about the dangers associated with the
flood control project were part of the "management of a flood control
facility."20 7 The Court, however, was merely dismissing the plaintiffs argu-
ment that the failure to give warnings about potential flood control re-
lated dangers in a recreational facility was unrelated to flood control. 20 8
By using this language, the Court did not eliminate the statutory require-
ment that the injuries be the result of "floods or flood waters."20 9
analysis developed by the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit, thereby falling in
line with the majority of courts. For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 69-
87 and accompanying text.
203. Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 83-85. For a complete description of the Boudreau
court's analysis, see supra notes 148-70 and accompanying text.
204. McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying
"wholly unrelated" standard); Morici Corp. v. United States, 681 F.2d 645 (9th Cir.
1982) (same); Pierce v. United States, 650 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1981) (same); Aetna
Ins. Co. v. United States, 628 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1980) (same); Peterson v. United
States, 367 F.2d 271 (9th Cir. 1966) (same). For a description of the Ninth Circuit
cases and their holdings, see supra notes 52-57, 78-87 and accompanying text.
205. See Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 86 (concluding Boudreau's injury resulted from
boating accident on flood control waters involving Government's patrol of those
waters by Coast Guard and therefore, immunity applied).
206. See McCarthy, 850 F.2d 558 (holding that immunity applied unless injury
was "wholly unrelated to flood control"). Therefore, using the McCarthy court's
language, Boudreau's injury was not "wholly unrelated" to flood control.
207. United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 610 (1986).
208. Id. In James, respondents argued that "even if § 702(c) is intended to
grant immunity in connection with flood control projects, the Federal Govern-
ment is not entitled to immunity here because their injuries arose from govern-
ment employees' alleged mismanagement of recreational activities wholly
unrelated to flood control." Id. at 609-10.
209. Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 87 (Smith, J., dissenting). The statute requires that
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Further, the facts of James were different from the facts in Boudreau.210
In James, the deaths of the recreational users were clearly caused by flood
waters, as the victims would not have drowned in the retaining structures
had the structures not been opened to release water to control flood-
ing.211 In contrast, in Boudreau, the appellant was injured because of the
alleged negligence of the Coast Guard in towing his boat, not because of
the operation of the lake for flood control purposes.21 2 In James, the
Supreme Court determined that immunity applied because the plaintiff's
injuries were the direct result of the release of flood waters for flood con-
trol purposes, which the immunity provision, on its face, was designed to
cover.2 1 3 This is the threshold issue that the Boudreau court avoided. 2 14
The dissent in Boudreau seems to have captured this point well, stating:
"IIT]he Supreme Court acknowledged that the language of section 702(c)
is broad; it did not indicate, however, that the provision should be read as
any damage related to the management of a federal flood control project
[is covered by the immunity provision] .,215
Even if the "management" language can be read into the statute as
the Boudreau court held, that should not end the analysis. The Seventh
Circuit in Fyman v. United States, gave a very interesting example of how
far the courts could extend the "management" language in order to pro-
tect the government from suit.2 1 6 The Seventh Circuit recognized that
management of flood control included building roads to beaches and hir-
ing personnel to manage and maintain them.2 1 7 The court explained that
if employees were negligent and allowed a tourist's car to be damaged by a
pothole, the government would be immune because such negligence was
"associated with flood control. '2 18 The Seventh Circuit then noted that it
was hard to conceive how this would be "damage from or by floods or
flood waters" within the scope of § 702(c).2 19
In Boudreau, the Fifth Circuit noted this example, but simply dis-
missed its relevance to the case before it.22 0 The court stated that it would
leave open the question of whether this example should influence future
210. For a discussion of the facts of James, see supra note 66. For a discussion
of the facts of Boudreau, see supra notes 134-45 and accompanying text.
211. James, 478 U.S. at 597.
212. Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 82.
213. James, 478 U.S. at 604.
214. See Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 86-87 (Smith, J., dissenting) (implying that
threshold issue is whether injuries were caused by floods or flood waters and this
was not proved by Boudreau).
215. Id. at 87. (Smith, J., dissenting).
216. Fryman v. United States, 901 F.2d 79, 81 (7th Cir. 1990). For a descrip-
tion of the example offered by the Seventh Circuit, see supra note 113.
217. Fryman, 901 F.2d at 81.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Boudreau, 53 F.3d at 85-86. The majority felt that its holding could not
be extended as far as the Seventh Circuit's example suggested. Id.
1520 [Vol. 41: p. 1487
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decisions.2 2 1 The court then concluded that Boudreau was safely removed
from the realm of cases which could fit into that overly broad example,
and that its holding in Boudreau would not extend immunity to such situa-
tions.22 2 It is difficult to see how the court reached this conclusion.
The Seventh Circuit correctly recognized that if the court is willing to
extend immunity to cover injuries which are somehow related to the
"management of a flood control facility," one must include injuries result-
ing from traffic accidents at the facility within that classification.223 The
Fifth Circuit attempted to narrow the language in the James decision
through its holding in Boudreau, but as the Seventh Circuit pointed out, "it
[is] hard to conceive how a decision interpreting [§ 702(c)] could have
been more broadly written.... James was so broadly written that it cannot
be applied literally."224 By failing to address the full implications of the
"management" language in James, the Fifth Circuit opened the door to the
extension of government immunity to those situations contemplated by
the Seventh Circuit.
The position taken by the Tenth Circuit is better reasoned. The
Tenth Circuit has broken away from the other circuits and their interpre-
tations of James.2 25 The Tenth Circuit, in Boyd, concluded that Congress
intended to shield the Government from liability associated with flood
control operation, not liability associated with the operation of a recrea-
221. Id.
222. Id. at 86. The majority did not give any clear reason why the example
was an over-application; it simply concluded that it did not have to concern itself
with the example given by the Seventh Circuit. Id. The majority felt that unlike
the example, Boudreau was not a case where one could say that management had
nothing to do with the injuries. Id. On the contrary, Boudreau's injury resulted
from a boating accident on flood control waters. Id. The majority felt that this was
far removed from the Seventh Circuit's example of a traffic accident on a beach
road. Id. The court concluded that Boudreau's injuries were therefore related to
the management of a flood control project, but to further emphasize this conclu-
sion, the court noted the government's position on how the accident occurred. Id.
The court commented:
The Government notes that, but for the creation of the flood control
project... Boudreau could not have been injured there. Although cau-
sation is disputed, the conditions on the Lake and the location of
Boudreau's vessel certainly made an accident of this nature more prob-
able. For example, not only did the accident occur at a flood control
lake, it occurred in an area that would not have been submerged without
flood control. Furthermore, it is evident from the record that the waves,
high winds, and other conditions on the lake could have contributed to
the accident.
Id. at 86 n.15.
223. Fryman, 901 F.2d at 81.
224. Id.
225. See Boyd v. United States, 881 F.2d 895, 900 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding
that Tenth Circuit would not stretch to "wholly unrelated" test and that § 702(c)
immunity would not apply in recreational situations). For additional discussion of
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tional facility.226 The court, therefore, held that the requisite nexus be-
tween flood control activities and injuries was not established in the case
of a snorkeler who was hit and killed by a recreational boat in a flood
control facility.2 2 7 The Tenth Circuit recognized that the James Court "ap-
peared to distinguish cases where damages occurred in waters not being
actively used for flood control purposes, by twice noting that the district
and appellate courts in that case had found that the waters were being
released for flood control purposes at the time of the accident.1
2 28
The Tenth Circuit also noted that the James Court cited the Fourth
Circuit's decision in United States v. Hayes,229 which stated that a plaintiff
could avoid the absolute bar of § 702(c) if he could show his injury was a
result of the facility's operation as a recreational facility and not a flood
control facility.2 30 The Tenth Circuit took the position that the Court in
James required a connection between flood control activities and injury
before immunity would apply, but that the James holding could not be
extended as far as the Ninth Circuit had ventured through its "wholly un-
related test."'23 1 Where the injury occurs as a result of the use of a flood
control project for recreational purposes, it is difficult to see how a plain
reading of the statute can result in the imposition of immunity. There-
fore, following the Tenth Circuit's more reasonable reading of James,
Boudreau was not decided correctly and should be reversed.
V. IMPACT
The Fifth Circuit's Boudreau decision will be an influential decision,
not only within the Fifth Circuit, but also among the other circuits as they
confront the issue of government immunity in flood control situations.
The Fifth Circuit, however, did not establish any bright line rule to guide
courts in making future decisions. 23 2 The Fifth Circuit's decision was very
broad and will therefore lead to reinterpretation each time a similar case
is brought before the court.233 The Fifth Circuit's decision will simply per-
226. Boyd, 881 F.2d at 900.
227. Id. at 896, 900; see also Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1005 (10th
Cir. 1995) (concluding that requisite nexus was shown in case of car accident on
ice covered highway next to flood control facility); Williams v. United States, 957
F.2d 742, 744-45 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating it would apply nexus test but flood con-
trol facility in this case does not trigger application of § 702(c)).
228. Boyd, 881 F.2d at 900.
229. 585 F.2d 701 (4th Cir. 1978).
230. Boyd, 881 F.2d at 900.
231. Id. The "wholly unrelated" test required a "but for" analysis between the
flood control activities and recreational injuries. Id. The court felt that: "Such a
connection between flood control activity and recreational injuries is too attenu-
ated to warrant the invocation of § 702(c)." Id.
232. For a discussion of the holding of the Fifth Circuit in Boudreau, see supra
notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
233. The Fifth Circuit based its holding on the Supreme Court's holding in
James. Boudreau v. United States, 53 F.3d 81, 83 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 771 (1996). The James decision was very broad, so broad that the Seventh Cir-
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petuate an injustice which has continued for a number of years.23 4
First, the Fifth Circuit, by merely falling in line with other circuits'
interpretations of Supreme Court precedent, continued to allow an out-
dated statute to govern an area of law where it should no longer apply.
2 35
When Congress enacted the Flood Control Act in 1928, flooding was an
extremely important and immediate problem.2 36 At the time of its enact-
ment, however, other possible purposes of flood control projects, such as
power generation, recreation and conservation were not considered.
23 7
Additionally, no consideration was given to the Act's possible impact on
the then nonexistent federal liability for personal injury and death caused
by the negligent operation of such projects. 2 38 In the older cases, the
statute served its purpose.2 39 The courts appropriately barred suits to re-
cover for property damage caused by the government's negligent opera-
tion of flood control facilities. 240 Times have changed, however, and
today the statute does not function as well as it did in the past.24 1 "Section
cuit felt it could not be applied literally. Fryman v. United States, 901 F.2d 79, 81
(7th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court decision has therefore not been uniformly
followed by every circuit creating a split among the circuits. For a discussion of the
circuit split, see supra note 12. It follows that the broad decision in Boudreau also
leaves room for differences in interpretation.
234. See Hiersche v. United States, 503 U.S. 923, 926 (1992) (mem.) (stating
that § 702 is obsolete legislative remnant and is nothing more than "engine of
injustice").
235. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of Supreme Court
precedent, see supra notes 151-64 and accompanying text.
236. For background on the Flood Control Act of 1928 and the events leading
up to its enactment, see supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
237. Hiersche, 503 U.S. at 925.
238. Id. For a further discussion of sovereign immunity, see supra note 11 and
accompanying text.
239. For a discussion of these cases and their holdings, see supra notes 41-49
and accompanying text.
240. Portis v. Folk Constr., 694 F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 1982) (barring recovery
against government for property damage caused by negligent operation of flood
control facilities); Morici Corp. v. United States, 681 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1982)
(same); Pierce v. United States, 650 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1981) (same); Aetna Ins.
Co. v. United States, 628 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1980) (same); Burlison v. United
States, 627 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1980) (same); Taylor v. United States, 590 F.2d 263
(8th Cir. 1979) (same); Lenoir v. Porters Creek Watershed Dist., 586 F.2d 1081
(6th Cir. 1977) (same); Hayes v. United States, 585 F.2d 701 (4th Cir. 1978)
(same); Callaway v. United States, 568 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1978) (same); Florida E.
Coast Ry. Co. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1975) (same); McClaskey v.
United States, 386 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1967) (same); Parks v. United States, 370 F.2d
92 (2d Cir. 1966) (same); Stover v. United States, 332 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1964)
(same); Clark v. United States, 218 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1954) (same); National Mfg.
Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1954) (same).
241. Compare Fryman v. United States, 901 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1990) (exemplify-
ing modem case which developed one interpretation of how § 702(c) applied to
case involving injuries sustained at multi-purpose facility), with Boyd v. United
States, Army Corps of Eng'rs, 881 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1989) (providing different
application of § 702(c) to similar situation as that which occurred in Fryman), and
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702(c) now plays a role no one could have anticipated in 1928."242 Cases
causing controversy in the courts today are those like Boudreau, involving
accidents occurring at flood control facilities which are being used for
other purposes in addition to flood control.243 This old legislation is no
longer applicable to all the situations which have and will come before the
courts.
244
Second, the broadness of the Boudreau decision allows future courts to
extend the immunity provision to situations it was never intended to
reach. At least one circuit has stated that Congress never intended the
statute to address liability for accidents occurring in projects operated as
recreational facilities. 245 Because Boudreau involved an accident resulting
from the recreational use of a flood control facility, it fell beyond the stat-
utes reach. 246 Nevertheless, the court found a way to read the James deci-
sion and other circuit court precedent to allow the Government to claim
immunity in such situations.
Finally, the Boudreau decision will have a serious impact on future liti-
gants who have suffered severe injury because of governmental negligence
in the operation or management of multi-purpose flood control facilities.
These litigants face the prospect of having their case dismissed by the Fifth
Circuit, although dismissal would be based upon a statute that was never
intended to cover such cases.247 Moreover, these litigants will never be
able to recover for personal injuries even when the injuries were clearly
the result of the government's negligence in the care, upkeep and opera-
tion of a recreational facility.
Although Boudreau seems to be just another case in a sea of cases in-
volving flood control and government immunity, it makes a clear state-
ment regarding the action taken by our judicial system when interpreting
outdated legislation. Perhaps the real solution to this problem lies with
McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1988) (providing yet another
different application of § 702(c) to similar situation as that of Boyd and Fryman).
242. Fyman, 901 F.2d at 80.
243. See, e.g., Reese v. South Fla. Water Management Dist., 59 F.3d 1128 (11th
Cir. 1995) (involving accident occurring at multi-purpose flood control facility);
Fisher v. United States, 31 F.3d 683 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); Dawson v. United
States, 894 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); Fyman, 901 F.2d at 79 (same); Boyd, 881
F.2d at 895 (same); Mocklin v. Orleans Levee Dist. 877 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1989)
(same); McCarthy, 850 F.2d at 558 (same). For a discussion of some of these cases
and others, see supra notes 77-126 and accompanying text.
244. See Hiersche, 503 U.S. at 926 (stating that legislation is "obsolete" and
"engine of injustice").
245. Boyd, 881 F.2d at 900. "Congress' concern was to shield the government
from liability associated with flood control operations, not liability associated with
operating a recreational facility." Id. (citation omitted).
246. For a narrative discussion of the majority opinion in Boudreau, see supra
notes 148-70 and accompanying text.
247. See Boyd, 881 F.2d at 900 (determining statute was not designed to'cover
liability associated with recreational facility).
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1996] NOTE 1525
Congress.2 48 After all, it is Congress's duty to address outdated legislation
that needs to be repealed or amended.249 This responsibility should not
fall upon the shoulders of the courts. Unfortunately, without further gui-
dance from Congress, the courts are forced to develop their own interpre-
tations of § 702(c) in order to achieve justice for those who have been
wronged by the government's negligence.
Mary Jean Pedersen
248. See Hiersche, 503 U.S. at 926 (indicating Congress, and not Supreme
Court, should solve split among circuits).
249. Id. The Hiersche Court stated: "Congress, not this Court, has the primary
duty to confront the question whether any part of this harsh immunity doctrine
should be retained." Id.
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